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THESIS

ARMY TRANSFORMATION LEADERSHIP
A STUDY OF CORE COMPETENCIES FOR CIVILIAN
LEADERSHIP

by

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September 2006

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The U. S. Army is undergoing a substantial departure from its historical underpinnings to adapt and succeed in the emerging arena of asymmetric warfare—i.e., migrating from a traditional 'heavy' approach to an agile and responsive capability. Changes are not limited to equipment and doctrine, but are pervasive throughout all aspects of infrastructure and processes, including leadership. Army Transformation is outlined by the Department of Defense (DoD) April 2003 Transformation Planning Guidance and the subsequent 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap. One tenet of leadership transformation includes increased capability to develop and sustain innovation. This paper analyzes civilian leadership competencies and capabilities related to the current Army training environment and identifies leadership competencies and capabilities deemed crucial for civilian leadership transformation. A researchers-developed survey and interviews revealed noteworthy conclusions, including the following: (1) Civilian and military personnel share a common view of core leadership competencies required for transformative change; (2) Diversity of leadership experiences was widely regarded as a core leadership competency and is generally considered inadequate for civilian leadership; and (3) Cultural differences between civilian and military leadership are narrowing, but momentum must be nourished and encouraged to affect positive and permanent leadership improvements for Army civilians.

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The U. S. Army is undergoing a substantial departure from its historical underpinnings to adapt and succeed in the emerging arena of asymmetric warfare—i.e., migrating from a traditional 'heavy' approach to an agile and responsive capability. Changes are not limited to equipment and doctrine, but are pervasive throughout all aspects of infrastructure and processes, including leadership. Army Transformation is outlined by the Department of Defense (DoD) April 2003 Transformation Planning Guidance and the subsequent 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap. One tenet of leadership transformation includes increased capability to develop and sustain innovation. This paper analyzes civilian leadership competencies and capabilities related to the current Army training environment and identifies leadership competencies and capabilities deemed crucial for civilian leadership transformation. A researchers-developed survey and interviews revealed noteworthy conclusions, including the following: (1) Civilian and military personnel share a common view of core leadership competencies required for transformative change; (2) Diversity of leadership experiences was widely regarded as a core leadership competency and is generally considered inadequate for civilian leadership; and (3) Cultural differences between civilian and military leaders are narrowing, but momentum must be nourished and encouraged to affect positive and permanent leadership improvements for Army civilians.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAC	Army Acquisition Corps
AAW	Army Acquisition Workforce
AMC	U.S. Army Materiel Command
AMSC	Army Management Staff College
ASA(ALT)	Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology
ASC	Acquisition Support Center
ATLDP	Army Training and Leader Development Panel
ATR	Army Transformation Roadmap
CDG	Competitive Development Group
CES	Civilian Education System
CGSC	Command & General Staff College
CSA	Chief of Staff of the Army
DA	Department of the Army
DAU	Defense Acquisition University
DLAMP	Defense Leadership and Management Program
DoD	Department of Defense
FCS	Future Combat System
FM	Field Manual
FORSCOM	U.S. Army Forces Command
GO	General Officer
GS	General Schedule
IPT	Integrated Product Team
IQ	Intelligence Quotient
LCMC	Life Cycle Management Command
LPI	Leadership Practices Inventory
MIL2CIV	Military to Civilian
MILDEP	Military Deputy to the Army Acquisition Executive
NSPS	National Security Personnel System
PEO	Program Executive Officer
PM	Project Manager
SBLM	Sustaining Base & Leadership Management
SCRC	Strategic Conclusions and Recommendations Conference
SES	Senior Executive Service
SFC	Sergeant First Class
SGM	Sergeant Major
SME	Subject Matter Expert
TRADOC	U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Army Acquisition community can, perhaps, be maligned and criticized for being big, bureaucratic, and slow to respond. The perception by some is that the Army civilian workforce is relatively uneducated and unfamiliar with effective leadership principles. It became clear to this team during our Master's research that documented differences between military and civilian leaders do exist, and that Army and executive civilian leaders alike contend that positive steps are needed to close that gap. The team embraced the challenge of identifying the leadership competencies required of faithful stewards and advocates for transformative change mandated by the Department of Defense. Due to the enormity of the topic of *leadership*, analysis and conclusions are framed in terms of existing training programs. Our findings support the assertion that leadership gaps exist between civilian and military leaders and that much commonality does exist among identified competencies for effective leadership. We briefly examined the role of the cultural differences between the two to evaluate their impact and noted that civilian attitudes towards leadership development must awaken and improve. As the Army potentially migrates towards greater dependence on civilian leadership, the cultural shift becomes pivotal in the Army's steadfast pursuit of acquisition excellence. This cultural shift then becomes a key tenet of Army Transformation.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

As the Army progresses towards the Department of Defense (DoD) initiative explained in its April 2003 Transformation Planning Guidance, a substantially different acquisition environment is taking shape. This revolutionary change, termed Transformation, applies to all four branches of the Armed Services. In short, the Army is attempting to fundamentally change its business acquisition structure, processes, and results. Army civilian leadership, in particular, is being challenged to adopt new competencies deemed necessary to support and sustain meaningful transformation. This research identifies emerging leadership competencies derived from responses to a researchers-developed survey and semi-structured interviews conducted with five civilian, four retired military, and four active-duty military respondents. Specifically, this study identifies civilian leadership training "gaps" and makes recommendations to assist leaders and managers to strengthen needed competencies.

B. BACKGROUND

A 2003 report evaluating Department of the Army (DA) leadership effectiveness (Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP), 2003) identified significant differences between military and civilian leadership practices and competencies. This report attributed those differences to the training environment and requirements of the two groups and pointed to a leadership training deficiency among Army civilians.

In direct support of Army Transformation, Army civilians are increasingly assuming more leadership roles and responsibilities (Army Transformation Roadmap, 2004). An underlying premise of the 2003 report was that for Army civilian leaders to understand, embrace, and encourage transformation efforts

throughout the workforce, specific leadership competencies must be identified and taught systematically and pervasively. Identification of the required core leadership competencies is an objective of this research paper.

C. SCOPE OF PROJECT

The United States Army is undergoing a substantial departure from its historical underpinnings to adapt, transform, and succeed in the emerging arena of asymmetric warfare, i.e., migrating from a traditional "heavy" approach to an agile and responsive capability. Changes are not limited to new equipment and revised doctrine, but are pervasive throughout all aspects of infrastructure and processes, including a transformed military and civilian leadership. Army Transformation is outlined by the Department of Defense (DoD) April 2003 Transformation Planning Guidance and the subsequent 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap (ATR). One tenet of leadership transformation includes increased capability to develop and sustain innovation. This paper identifies leadership competencies and capabilities deemed crucial for Army Transformation. Leadership competencies and capabilities in the current training environment were analyzed. A researchers-developed survey and semi-structured interviews revealed noteworthy conclusions including the following: (1) Civilian and military personnel, in general, share a common view of core leadership competencies required for transformative change; (2) Diversity of leadership experiences was widely regarded as a core leadership competency and is generally considered inadequate for civilian leadership; and (3) Cultural differences between civilian and military leaders are narrowing but must continue to do so in order to shape positive and permanent leadership improvements for Army civilians.

D.   METHODOLOGY/ORGANIZATION

This study used a three-tiered approach. A five-person research team collectively developed an action plan to obtain necessary data and to aggregate individual findings and recommendations into a consolidated report. The following paragraphs further detail the approach taken by the research team.

Initially, a researchers-developed survey was used to obtain responses from approximately 4,200 respondents in the Army Acquisition Workforce (AAW), identifying perceptions of core leadership competencies needed to successfully accomplish mandated Army Transformation. The survey data were complemented by responses to semi-structured interviews conducted with five civilian, four retired military, and four active-duty military leaders.

Next, the current Army leadership development curriculum was evaluated and compared to perceived transformation competencies identified from the survey and interviews. Potential gaps between the current training environment and perceived competencies of Army acquisition civilian leaders were identified.

Finally, conclusions were drawn concerning the competencies needed by Army civilian leaders to understand, embrace, and transmit successful transformation, including recommendations to assist leaders and managers in training and education efforts. The team also developed recommendations for further research.

E.   BENEFITS OF THE STUDY

This study should assist Army leaders and managers to both understand possible needed competencies and to implement meaningful and impactful training and education programs. Recommendations focus on closing identifiable gaps between the existing military and civilian leadership expectations and competencies needed to carry out the mandate of Army Transformation.

As civilian leadership roles in Army Acquisition continue to grow in number and responsibility, Army Transformation objectives will have a higher probability of successfully being met, both on the battlefield and in the business arena.

II.   FRAMING THE STUDY

A.   INTRODUCTION

Civilian leader development is a critical issue facing the Department of the Army as it deals with transformation, force restructuring and repositioning, outsourcing, changes in roles, missions, and other areas. To ensure that the Army was effectively preparing to meet future needs, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) directed an Army-wide study in 2002-2003.

The findings of the study were based on data obtained from more than 40,000 Army civilians, soldiers, and senior leaders. The study utilized four collection methods and capitalized on information from recent studies and relevant databases.

The first step in organizing the study was to convene a group of 20 subject-matter experts (SMEs). The next step was to develop a written survey for General Schedule (GS)-7 through GS-15 employees and supervisors, noncommissioned officers (Sergeant First Class (SFC) through Sergeant Major (SGM)), warrant officers, and field grade officers (MAJ – COL). The 238-item survey was then mailed to more than 95,000 Army civilians and soldiers, more than a third of whom responded.

The study also included 264 interviews with senior executive service members (SESs), general officers (GOs), garrison commanders, and other installation management personnel. One hundred twenty-seven SESs and 76 GOs responded to the 86-item on-line survey.

Study group members were organized into three study teams, one for each of the following areas:

•Army Culture

•Institutional Training

•Operational Training

The study teams presented draft findings, conclusions, and recommendations to an executive panel, which then reviewed and discussed the teams' findings. The panel subsequently made suggestions for changes and forwarded those recommendations to the Strategic Conclusions and Recommendations Conference (SCRC). The SCRC reviewed the draft conclusions and recommendations to ensure they were feasible and would be acceptable to the Army.

The study clearly identified several areas needing attention. Two critical problems were identified. The first was that civilians within the Army were not being adequately prepared to assume leadership roles. The second was the current civilian leader development system did not provide optimum opportunity for the Army to meet its transformation needs. The bottom-line finding in the final report—Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) Phase IV (Civilian), dated 24 February 2003—stated:

> The Army Vision emphasizes People, Readiness, and Transformation—in that order. No amount of money or cutting-edge technology will achieve readiness or transformation without people, the Army's centerpiece. The leadership of those people is the key to fulfilling the Army Vision. The Army grows and develops the best soldiers in the world—and trains them to be leaders. However, growing Army civilian leaders has fallen short of that requirement [emphasis added].

The study recommended four main imperatives to maximize Army civilian contributions to the Army and twelve general recommendations under the four imperatives. Forty specific recommendations coming from the twelve general recommendations were also tied to the four main imperatives. These recommendations were developed to provide direction for improving the systems and processes for developing civilians and growing leaders. The four imperatives identified were:

•Accountability

•Lifelong Learning

•Interpersonal Skills

•Army Culture

B.   ACCOUNTABILITY

There have been numerous studies over the past ten to 15 years aimed at improving management and leadership in the Federal Government. Many of the findings in these studies underscore the common themes found in the ATLDP study, including the following:

•There is no integrated, systemic approach for Army civilian leader development.

•Army civilians are not aware of leader development and training opportunities.

•Army civilians are frustrated by lack of opportunities to advance.

•Supervisors are more effective in technical and conceptual skills than in interpersonal skills.

•The Army is not developing civilian leaders for the future.

It is evident from these previous studies that the Army has been aware of its shortfalls in developing Army civilian leaders but, for whatever reason, has not followed through on the ATLDP recommendations. The Army has not made the necessary changes to effectively prepare civilian leaders to engage the challenges associated with Army Transformation—i.e., it has made insufficient efforts to institute accountability to meet identified mandates in the area of leadership development. Accountability would ideally start with the individual employee,

extending vertically up the chain of command. The following findings resulted from respondent data concerning accountability:

- •70% of senior leaders report that Army civilian leader development programs have a low priority in relation to other tasks.

- •64% of supervisors and 52% of SESs say their organizations have less funding for training Army civilians than they need.

- •33% of senior leaders believe that current leader development programs are ineffective.

- •More than 33% of all respondents say lack of resources (e.g., time, money) and excessive workload interferes with receiving leader development training.

- •The majority of SESs and GOs believe that low priority of leader development, employee workload and unwillingness to relocate detracts from the development of effective Army civilian leaders.

- •Only 12% of Army civilians are eligible for the civilian core leadership courses, and this audience is not attending them.

- •51% of civilian supervisors say that their organization has less access to training courses or programs than it needs.

- •Less than 50% of Army civilian supervisors say that supervisors, coworkers, career program/field guidelines, Army Civilian Training, Education, and Development System plans, and Civilian Personnel Advisory Center personnel specialists are effective in letting them know how to develop as an Army civilian leader.

- •About 25% of SESs/GOs report that supervisors/managers resist supporting leader development and that the right Army civilians are not identified for the right training.

- •45% of SESs/GOs report "nothing" or "not much" or did not respond to the question asking, "What is being done in your organization to overcome barriers to leader development?" Focus-group responses indicated lack of any knowledge of policies, a lack of policies, or lack of knowledge that a policy exists.

•Less than 50% of the Army civilians believe that performance counseling helps them know their strengths and weaknesses on the job.

The study group relating to accountability provided two recommendations:

•Make Army civilian training, education and leadership development a high priority.

•Ensure that the Army civilian performance evaluation system provides effective performance accountability and feedback and provides for professional development.

C.   LIFELONG LEARNING

Learning can be considered the underlying premise for and critical contributor to all leadership development. Because leaders exist and function within an organizational context, organizations would, thus, be responsible for motivating employees to make learning a lifelong pursuit. Obviously the two axioms are somewhat inseparable: organizations learn to the extent that individual employees learn. One without the other forebodes failure to reach full potential. Similarly, lifelong learning would need top-down support and direct linkage to an organization's strategic plans and goals. Careful planning and continual development of increasingly challenging work assignments and work design become ingredients for balancing training, education and development, operational assignments, self-development, and mentoring. The following findings resulted from respondent data concerning lifelong learning:

•The majority of respondents want a leader development system similar to the system that exists for soldiers.

•The field would like to see more Army civilians provided with leader development training earlier in their careers.

•Many respondents indicate they have little or no help in finding training and other opportunities to develop themselves.

•The majority of respondents would like more training to be available at their own installations, on-line, and by correspondence because they are often not allowed to travel to attend training.

•Respondents would like a variety of assignments to gain on-the-job training and assignments aligned with training so that the learning can be reinforced.

•Nearly 50% of senior leaders believe that insufficient opportunities exist for Army civilian leader development and that Army civilians in their organizations are not being adequately developed to "lead change."

•Senior leaders also believe that the priority given existing leader development programs is too low compared to other initiatives and that the absence of a centralized approach to leader development is an obstacle to adequate leader development training for Army civilians.

•About 50% of the senior leaders said "nothing" or "not much" is being done in their organizations to overcome barriers to effective leader development.

•Many Army civilians requested a document that shows specific steps, such as a checklist or road map and tying training to career progression.

The following recommendations were made concerning lifelong learning:

•Create a training and development paradigm that incorporates a lifelong learning philosophy.

•Replace the current civilian career programs and career fields with a broad career management system for all Army civilians in support of readiness.

•Implement a developmental continuum for Army civilians.

•Promote self-development as part of the Army lifelong learning philosophy.

•Publish and make accessible guidelines.

•Develop a centralized Army education system, integrating civilian and military individual training, education, and development where appropriate.

D. INTERPERSONAL SKILLS

Regardless of the ability to spot organizational problems or to articulate a long-term vision for achieving organizational success, ultimately, a leader's ability to persuade employees to adapt to needed changes becomes paramount. Interpersonal skills are critical for generating and sustaining momentum to accomplish change and for maintaining organization-wide focus on organizational goals and objectives. Leaders' understanding of human capital and utilization of their interpersonal skills directly impact organizational climate for better or for worse, and organizational climate appears to affect productivity. The logic for investing in and developing civilian leaders skilled in interpersonal behavior becomes obvious—i.e., motivating and inspiring others, obtaining support and commitment from subordinates and stakeholders, developing team effectiveness, and aligning structural variables (technology and rewards) to ensure positive climates conducive to high productivity.

Research has shown that the way people feel about their organization can account for 20–30% of the organization's performance. Furthermore, organizational leaders account for 50–70% of how employees perceive their organization's climate (Goleman, 2002). Clearly, the use—and, unfortunately, misuse—of interpersonal skills directly impacts organizational performance. The following findings resulted from respondent data concerning interpersonal skills:

- •Army civilians, SESs, and GOs view interpersonal skills as the most important leadership dimension for today's and tomorrow's leaders.

- •Army civilian leaders are seen as more competent in their technical specialities than in their interpersonal skills.

- •The most frequently mentioned interpersonal skill is communication. Communication skills include: active listening, writing, and public speaking/briefing. Communication skills also include interacting and working with coworkers and supervisors, as well as customer service/care skills.

•Understanding people is the second most frequently mentioned interpersonal skill. This refers to understanding and interacting with a

diverse workforce, including acceptance of different personalities and work styles, as well as understanding different perspectives.

•The third most frequently mentioned interpersonal skill is team building.

•Some respondents mentioned that the Army should evaluate leadership potential before hiring people for supervisory positions.

•Focus groups indicate that Army civilians want more leadership courses in general.

•Many respondents complained about the quality of their own supervisors and about their own lack of supervisory skills. They would like leader development courses to be open to all levels.

•Thirty percent of all Army employees are not satisfied with the degree of open communication between civilian supervisors and civilian subordinates.

The study group provided the following recommendation with respect to interpersonal skills:

•Make interpersonal skills development a priority by taking the following steps/actions:

> 1. Make interpersonal skills a dimension of performance evaluation for people on the leadership track.

> 2. Make interpersonal skills a selection criterion for leadership positions.

> 3. The Army must provide interpersonal skills training at all levels of leader and employee development.

E.   ARMY CULTURE

According to Field Manual (FM) 22-100 Army Leadership, culture is "a group's shared set of beliefs, values, and assumptions about what's important." An organization's culture can be understood as the sum total of its members'

assumptions, beliefs, and values and is expressed through "what is done, how it is done, and who is doing it" (Farmer, 1990). Because culture runs deep and is slow to change, many employess can take culture for granted, not fully appreciating its substantial impact throughout the organization—i.e., on decision-making, communications, perceptions, levels of output, and intended outcomes. Therefore, understanding why (sub)cultures behave the way they do becomes essential for understanding the forces driving those behaviors. According to Farmer, "failure to understand the way in which an organization's culture will interact with various contemplated change strategies thus may mean the failure of the strategies themselves" (Farmer, 1990). Case studies of corporations undergoing change (Wilms, 1996; Zell, 1997) and institutions engaging in transformation efforts (Kezar & Eckel, 2000) reveal that organizational culture can either facilitate or inhibit institutional transformation, depending on the fit between the existing culture and the proposed change. The following findings resulted from respondent data concerning Army culture:

•Army civilians are committed to making a career with the Army.

•Most Army civilians (97–99%) plan to stay with the Army until they are at least retirement-eligible.

•A sizeable majority (70-80%) of respondents also believe that their coworkers intend to make a career with the Army.

•A sizeable majority (61–78%) of respondents perceive their coworkers to be satisfied working for the Army. A sizeable majority (71–84%) would recommend the Army as a good employer.

•A sizeable to vast majority (68-86%) perceive that their coworkers are willing to put in extra hours and extra effort to complete work assignments if needed to do so.

•A sizeable majority (65–76%) of Army civilians agree that "pride in the Army" and "desire to serve their country" are important factors influencing Army civilians to continue working for the Army.

•SESs and GOs agree with Army civilians about the level of importance of work and pride in influencing them to continue to work for the Army, but senior leadership underestimates the level of importance to Army civilians of pay, benefits, job security, promotion opportunities, and training and education.

•A vast majority (70—88%) of Army civilians perceive that their coworkers demonstrate Army values in their work. A majority to vast majority (51—61% of employees and 67%—80% of supervisors) perceive that their Army civilian leaders practice Army values.

The following recommendations were made concerning Army culture:

•Integrate and strengthen relationships among Officers, Warrant Officers, Noncommissioned Officers, and Army civilians within the Army.

•The Army must increase its commitment to Army civilians.

•Adopt and incorporate into doctrine the following:
"The Army Civilian Corps is an experienced professional cadre committed to serve the nation." and "The Army Civilian Corps provides mission-essential capability, stability, and continuity during war and peace in support of the soldier."

F.   SUMMARY

The Army Civilian Study of 2002-2003 was the largest self-assessment ever done by the Army. Completed in January 2003, the study confirms the Army's plan to train soldiers and civilians and to grow them into leaders through training and leader development programs. However, it further states the Army has fallen short with respect to growing its civilian leaders. The study points out that the Army's policies are out of balance with the expectations of Army civilians. The study also brings to light that the Army has failed to provide leadership training opportunities to its civilians and that the future environment in which Army civilians will operate will require higher levels of leadership competencies.

The study culminates with the following recommendations and imperatives surrounding:

Accountability – The Army must make developing civilians a high priority; tie personal, professional, and job performance together; accomplish the study's recommendations; and evaluate effectiveness.

Lifelong Learning – The Army should revamp career management with "gates" for progression and build an effective Civilian Education System (CES).

Interpersonal Skills – The Army must recognize that they are pivotal to leader competence, teach them, and select leaders that exhibit them.

Army Culture – Currently, there are two cultures: Uniform and Civilian. The Army must integrate them into one.

The study emphasized the following five recommendations:

1. Make Army Civilian training, education and leader development a priority.

2. Integrate civilian and military individual training, education, and development where possible.

3. Improve the relationship among all members of the force.

4. Create a training and development program that incorporates lifelong learning.

5. Make interpersonal skills development a priority.

The Panel's final recommendations to the Army Chief of Staff were to take the following **immediate actions:**

•Publish a CSA statement about the importance of the interdependent relationships among the cohorts that compose the Army Team.

•Establish the Army Civilian Corps by redesignating Department of the Army civilians as members of the Army Civilian Corps.

•Support reaffirmation of the oath of office for Army civilians.

•Adopt the new Army Civilian Creed.

•Implement combined SES/GO orientation training.

•Implement a Strategic Communications Campaign Plan for Army Civilians.

•Establish a Civilian Advisory Board.

•Publish an Army Civilian Handbook.

•Commit to the protection of resources for civilian leadership development.

•Improve the relationship among the Army components.

•Integrate civilian and military individual training, education, and development where appropriate.

•Create a training and development system that incorporates lifelong learning and emphasizes interpersonal skills.

III.   AN ACADEMIC REVIEW OF ARMY LEADERSHIP

A.   INTRODUCTION

To understand what leadership means to today's Army, it is important to establish a baseline of how the institutional Army views leadership and how conventional management theory supports different leadership models referenced by the Army. Both views of leadership are integral to establishing a framework and theoretical background for this study.

B.   INSTITUTIONAL ARMY LEADERSHIP

The Army field manual on leadership, FM 22-100 Army Leadership, represents the Army's doctrinal position on leadership for both military and civilian personnel. While FM 22-100 covers a wide berth of leadership areas— including practical performance evaluation techniques with examples—this section will focus more on the leadership theory, framework, and concepts outlined in the manual. It should be noted that the current version of FM 22-100, dated August 1999, addresses leaders at all levels, including civilians.   The previous version focused on leadership at the battalion level and below and targeted military only. Additionally, the current FM 22-100 has been expanded to supersede four other publications: FM 22-101 (Leadership Counseling); FM 22-102 (Soldier Team Development); FM 22-103 (Leadership and Command at Senior Levels); and DA Pamphlet 600-80 (Executive Leadership). The manual defines leadership as follows:

> Leadership is influencing people—by providing purpose, direction, and motivation—while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization.

C. THE ARMY LEADERSHIP FRAMEWORK

Figure 1 below depicts the Army's framework for addressing leadership. The basic premise is that the Army leader must "Be," "Know," and "Do" to be a successful leader. The top of the figure indicates four areas that the military or civilian leader must be, know, or do: Values, Attributes, Skills, and Actions.

Figure 1: Army Leadership Framework

Within these four main categories, there are specific and general dimensions of Army leadership. In some cases, they are relatively specific, such as integrity. In others, they are represented by broader subcategories such as mental, physical, and emotional. It is important to note that these same values, attributes, skills, and characteristics represent the structural basis for many of the leadership knowledges examined and analyzed within this research paper.

1. "Be" a Leader

This element of "Be, Know, Do" is described as the leader's character. The Army is a "values-based" institution that heavily emphasizes the individual

leader's need to set high standards, lead by example, do what is legally and morally right, and influence others to do the same. The Army leader must not only understand Army values and develop appropriate attributes, but also practice them daily.

2. "Know" the Right Things

The "Know" element indicates that a leader must possess certain skills and knowledge to be a competent leader. As shown in the framework and in Figure 2, this element is subdivided across four domains: interpersonal skills, conceptual skills, technical skills, and tactical skills.

> ➢ **Interpersonal Skills** - knowledge of your people and how to work with them.
>
> ➢ **Conceptual Skills** - the ability to understand and apply the doctrine and other ideas required to do your job.
>
> ➢ **Technical Skills** – how to use your equipment.
>
> ➢ **Tactical Skills** – the ability to make the right decisions concerning employment of units in combat.

Figure 2: Four Domains of "Knowing"

3. "Do" the Right Things

The "Do" element represents the actions taken by leaders. Leader actions are divided into three categories: influencing, operating, and improving. These are illustrated in Figure 3.

> **Influencing** – making decisions, communicating those decisions, and motivating people.

> **Operating** - the things you do to accomplish your organization's immediate mission.

> **Improving** – the things you do to increase your organization's capability to accomplish current or future missions.

Figure 3: Three Categories of "Doing"

D.   LEADERSHIP LEVELS

Another model used by the Army illustrates the different levels of leadership subdivided into three distinct types. Figure 4 graphically depicts the three levels: direct leadership, organizational leadership, and strategic leadership.

Figure 4: The Three Leadership Levels

1. Direct Leadership

This level of leadership is basically first-line leadership where there is direct interaction between the leader and subordinates on a fairly frequent basis. The interaction is usually at least weekly and can be daily. The key element of direct leadership is direct contact and interaction between the leader and subordinate personnel.

2. Organizational Leadership

Organizational leadership is characterized by a larger span of control, where leaders influence several hundred to several thousand people. The leader accomplishes the control through several levels of subordinates and usually will have a staff to help lead and manage resources under his/her area of responsibility. The organizational leader must possess many of the skills of a direct leader, though the degree is different. There is more emphasis on influencing, through policymaking and systems integration, than in direct face-to-face management with subordinates. Organizational leaders at this level typically are military leaders at the brigade through corps levels, military and DA civilian leaders at directorate through installation levels, and DA civilians at the assistant through undersecretary of the Army levels. Their focus is generally on planning and mission spanning two to ten years in the future.

3. Strategic Leadership

Strategic leaders are involved in the internal and external environments within which the Army operates. These leaders include both military and civilian members at the major command (FORSCOM, TRADOC, AMC, etc.) through Department of Defense levels. Span of control ranges from several thousand personnel to hundreds of thousands of personnel. Strategic leaders address complex problems and are responsible for high-level functions, including: establishing force structure; allocating resources; communicating strategic vision; and preparing their commands for future roles and missions. In today's

environment, there is increasing emphasis on interoperability and joint operations at the strategic level. The strategic leader is often concerned with Congressional hearings, service wide constraints, weapon system acquisition, research and development, and interservice cooperation.

E.   ARMY LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT MODEL

1. Institutional Training

The Army school system is modeled on a progressive learning model similar to that of public education. The primary difference is that the Army expects personnel to use their skills in an assignment before being considered for the next level of schooling. This institutional training is a critical component in developing and preparing leaders for increased responsibility. The Army model for leadership development is built on many of the tenets included in the leadership framework, plus a three-tiered training model that consists of institutional, operational, and self-development. Figure 5 depicts the leader development model.

Figure 5: Leader Development Model

2. Operational Assignments

Progressive operational assignments represent a major leg of the leadership development for both civilian and military personnel. Operational assignments are considered by many as on-the-job-training. These opportunities allow leaders to broaden the knowledge and refine the skills learned from institutional training and previous assignments. Progressive operational assignments are, perhaps, the most powerful element in the model for leader development.

3. Self-Development

The third leg of the leader development model is self-development. The self-development process is designed to enhance the leader's previously acquired skills, knowledge, and experience by focusing on areas that need improvement. Self-development is continuous and involves two-way interaction between the leader and his/her first-line supervisor.

F.   CONVENTIONAL MANAGEMENT THEORY

Conventional business theory on leadership changes or evolves over time. For example, there was a time when any discussion on managerial techniques involved reference to Dr. Ken Blanchard's and Dr. Spencer Johnson's The One Minute Manager or Stephen Covey's Seven Habits of Highly Effective People. Though not as widely publicized, today's discussion of leadership might include reference to James Kouze's and Barry Posner's The Leadership Challenge or Daniel Goleman's Emotional Intelligence (Topping, 2002). To examine whether Army leadership theory is contemporary, this section will detail some of the attributes of the leadership models laid out by Kouze, Posner, and Goleman and will provide a summary comparison. Additionally, it will discuss key competencies, as documented in Peter Topping's Managerial Leadership.

Prior to Knowledge Wave 2003-The Leadership Forum (February 2003), McKinsey and Company produced a background paper as a primer and discussion document that summarizes the evolution of leadership research and theory over time. Figure 6 illustrates that, when looking back over the evolution of leadership thinking, one sees a succession of theories of what makes effective leadership, as well as a wide range of proposed leadership "styles" that describe how leaders operate (McKinsey & Company, 2003).

It is evident that the early research focused on the individual leader, and eventually the scope expanded to encompass the organization as a whole. The 1990s further expanded the scope of what comprises effective leadership with the idea of "network" leadership thinking. According to McKinsey & Company, network leadership argues that one leader alone is never enough—and that truly effective leaders aim to build a community of leaders and change-makers within the ranks of their organization, supporting them through knowledge management systems and appropriate development programs. It is interesting to note the leadership style for the "network school" period is described as "front-line/lieutenant and knowledge leadership." The use of a military term to describe the network school will be discussed in more detail in the following summary comparison section, but certainly an immediate link between network-focused leadership and the U.S. Army's military structure comes to mind.

FIVE HISTORICAL PERIODS IN LEADERSHIP RESEARCH

	Great Man school	Bureaucratic school	Human Relations school	Strategy school	Network school
Period	1900–1920	1930s	1950–1980	1980s	1990s
Research focus	• 'Great men' in history and contemporary society (eg Lincoln, Napoleon)	• Core management skills	• Emergence of leadership within informal groups	• How CEOs and top teams set new aspirations and align people and resources to achieve them	• How leadership occurs across members of a network
Research outcomes	• Lists of traits believed to predict the capacity for leadership (these trait theories were later discredited)	• Descriptions of executive responsibilities that stress the importance of the systematic development and application of rules	• Behavioural models of leadership and lists of leadership roles		• Descriptions of how leadership is enacted as a distributed responsibility
Leadership style	• Charismatic leadership	• Rational-legal authority	• Situational leadership • Servant leadership	• Transformational leadership • Visionary leadership	• Front-line /lieutenant leadership • Knowledge leadership

Source: McKinsey & Company

McKinsey&Company

Figure 6: Leadership Research Evolution

In The Leadership Challenge, Kouze and Posner describe their leadership model, which they based on data collected from thousands of successful and effective managers in order to determine what practices and behaviors they had in common. They used a "personal best" method to key in on the common threads within the stories recounted when managers were asked to think of a peak leadership experience. Kouze and Posner identified the following five competencies based on their findings:

•Model the Way

•Inspire a Shared Vision

•Challenge the Process

•Enable Others to Act

•Encourage the Heart

The study found that the top leaders exhibited certain attributes and characteristics associated with those five competencies listed above (Wiley, 2006). They are:

1.　　Model the Way

　　•Leaders establish principles concerning the way people (constituents, peers, colleagues, and customers alike) should be treated and the way goals should be pursued.
　　•They create standards of excellence and then set an example for others to follow.
　　•They set interim goals so that people can achieve small wins as they work toward larger objectives.
　　•They unravel bureaucracy when it impedes action; they put up signposts when people are unsure of where to go or how to get there; and they create opportunities for victory.

2.　　Inspire a Shared Vision

　　•Leaders passionately believe that they can make a difference.
　　•They envision the future, creating an ideal and unique image of what the organization can become.
　　•Through their magnetism and quiet persuasion, leaders enlist others in their dreams.
　　•They breathe life into their visions and get people to see exciting possibilities for the future.

3.　　Challenge the Process

　　•Leaders search for opportunities to change the status quo.

•They look for innovative ways to improve the organization and, in doing so, they experiment and take risks.
•Because leaders know that risk taking involves mistakes and failures, they accept the inevitable disappointments as learning opportunities.

4.   Enable Others to Act

•Leaders foster collaboration and build spirited teams.
•They actively involve others.
•Leaders understand that mutual respect is what sustains extraordinary efforts; they strive to create an atmosphere of trust and human dignity.
•They strengthen others, making each person feel capable and powerful.

5.   Encourage the Heart

•Accomplishing extraordinary things in organizations is hard work.
•To keep hope and determination alive, leaders recognize contributions that individuals make.
•In every winning team, the members need to share in the rewards of their efforts, so leaders celebrate accomplishments.
•They make people feel like heroes.

Kouze and Posner also developed a 360° feedback instrument called "The Leadership Practices Inventory (LPI)." The instrument is designed to assess an individual's effectiveness as perceived by his peers, subordinates, and supervisors. Specifically, the tool assesses the extent to which leaders actually use the five practices so that they can make plans for improvement.

Daniel Goleman's leadership model was first presented in his book Emotional Intelligence. He argues that human such as self-awareness, self-discipline, persistence, and empathy are of greater consequence than intelligence quotients (IQ) in much of life (Emotional Intelligence Consortium, 2004). These factors are defined as "emotional intelligence" and are described below in the five components of the model (Emotional Intelligence Consortium, 2004):

1. Self-Awareness

   •Emotional Awareness - Recognizing one's emotions and their effects
   •Accurate Self-Assessment - Knowing one's strengths and limits
   •Self-Confidence - Sureness about one's self-worth and capabilities

2. Self-Regulation

   •Self-control - Managing disruptive emotions and impulses
   •Trustworthiness - Maintaining standards of honesty and integrity
   •Conscientiousness - Taking responsibility for personal performance
   •Adaptability - Flexibility in handling change
   •Innovativeness - Being comfortable with and open to novel ideas and new information

3. Self-Motivation

   •Achievement drive - Striving to improve or meet a standard of excellence
   •Commitment - Aligning with the goals of the group or organization
   •Initiative - Readiness to act on opportunities
   •Optimism - Persistence in pursuing goals despite obstacles and setbacks

4. Social Awareness

   •Empathy - Sensing others' feelings and perspective, and taking an active interest in their concerns
   •Service orientation - Anticipating, recognizing, and meeting customers' needs
   •Developing others - Sensing what others need in order to develop and bolstering their abilities
   •Leveraging diversity - Cultivating opportunities through diverse people
   •Political awareness - Reading a group's emotional currents and power relationships

5. Social Skills

   •Influence - Wielding effective tactics for persuasion
   •Communication - Sending clear and convincing messages

•Leadership - Inspiring and guiding groups and people
•Change catalyst - Initiating or managing change
•Conflict management - Negotiating and resolving disagreements
•Building bonds - Nurturing instrumental relationships
•Collaboration and cooperation - Working with others toward shared goals
•Team capabilities - Creating group synergy in pursuing collective goals

Perhaps the message is that one does not have to be the smartest to be an effective leader. Rather, emotional maturity and credibility play more important roles in how well one provides leadership inside an organization (Topping, 2002). The key point is that there are many competencies other than pure intelligence or technical know-how that determine whether or not a leader is successful and effective.

Peter Topping points out in his book Managerial Leadership that competencies should have an orientation toward the future—i.e., what skills do our managers need to demonstrate five years from now to make our company successful, since it will take time to develop those competencies? (Topping, 2002) Topping and his colleague, Professor David Schweiger, were hired by the Robert Bosch Corporation (US) in 1995 to help the company develop the managerial competencies that would be required of its middle managers 20 years out. One of the key lessons they learned during this project was that involvement of the employees in developing the competencies was instrumental to the success of the project. They also concluded that in order for a manager to be an effective leader, he must be skilled in the three components of developing people: coaching, teaching, and mentoring. As a coach, a manager zeros in on results and developing associates' performance capabilities. As a teacher, he/she concentrates on helping people to learn and apply new their knowledge or skills. And, as a mentor, a manager focuses on their longer-term career and personal development (Topping, 2002). Additionally, Topping and Schweiger concluded that the list of nine competencies they defined needed to be developed through

both educational activities and on-the-job experiences. Topping suggests that education, by itself, lacks the learning that would be gained from application, and on-the-job experiences lack the focus of intensive education and are too slow without the turbo boosts from educational programs (Topping, 2002).

The matrix for on-the-job experiences, shown in Figure 7, illustrates how each competency can be methodically planned out with a structured development strategy. One final and important lesson was that the identification of a solid list of competencies does not accomplish anything if managers in the organization fail to use them as guides for development (Topping, 2002).

G. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This section compares the Army Leadership Framework to the referenced conventional management theory as previously outlined. The intent is not to determine whether or not the Army Leadership Framework is correct, but to make the case that the Army Leadership Framework is contemporary in its basic tenets and construct. Additionally, an examination of the work (particularly lessons learned) that Peter Topping completed at the Robert Bosch Corporation (US) in 1995 will be applied toward the competencies and follow-up efforts resulting from the survey addressed in this study.

Competency development matrix--on-the-job experiences.

BOSCH
Introduction
Besides formal education, there are "on-the-job managerial activities" that can enhance the development of managerial competencies. They should become an integral part of your associate development plan. In this part of the catalogue, such activities are described.

Experiences occur in one of two ways in organizations: a) each of us learns by doing his/her normal job; b) by organizing patterns of activities specific opportunities for learning can be created.

With the identification of the managerial competencies, it is now possible for us to use the second approach more systematically and effectively. It is the purpose of this section to focus on this approach and to illustrate the possible types of activities that can be structured and the competencies they are lost likely to develop.

In the following section you will find a matrix which illustrates the relationship between the activities and the competencies to which they specifically relate. Following the matrix is a description of each of the major activities.

	COMPETENCIES								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Development Activities	Personal Develop.	Risk Taking	Customer	Ethics	Problem Solving	Network	Strategy	Comm.	Business
Managing Challenging Situations	P	P	S	P	P	S	P	P	S
Job Rotation	P	S	P	P*	S	P	S	P	P
Job Exchange	P	P	S	P*	S	P	S	P	P
Special Team Projects	P	P	S	S	P	P	P	P	S
Mentoring	P	S	S	P	P	P	S	P	P
Nontraditional Roles	P	S	S	S	P	P	S	P	S
Teaching/Training	P	S	S	S	S	S	S	P	S
Orientation	S	S	S	S	S	P	S	S	P
Training Assignment	S	S	S	S	S	P	S	S	P

*Cross-country rotations   P= Primary topic for developing competency   S= Secondary topic for developing competency

Figure 7: On-The-Job Experience Matrix

According to McKinsey and Company's historical leadership evolution chart (Figure 6), the U.S. Army is currently in the network-school period. This period is described as focusing on how leadership occurs across members of a network and how leadership is enacted as a distributed responsibility. The leadership style for this period is described as front-line or lieutenant leadership along with knowledge leadership. Obviously, the U.S. Army, with its military and civilian structure, meets all the requirements of a complex network. The Army's leadership levels address how leadership is enacted as a distributed responsibility and, certainly, the military organizational structure of platoons, companies, battalions, brigades, divisions, and corps is indicative of the same. Whether the

leadership style of front-line or lieutenant is prevalent throughout the military hierarchy is debatable and is, most likely, a stretch. Nonetheless, the Army Leadership Framework supports the current network-school period and the relevance of network leadership theory.

The leadership challenge model is easily correlated to the Army Leadership Framework, and these are displayed graphically in Figure 8. "Modeling the way" is fundamentally about leadership values; "inspiring a shared vision" relates to motivating while communicating the common vision; "challenging the process" means assessing the situation and modifying the status quo or the current plan, otherwise known as adaptability; "enabling others to act" is empowering others by giving them the respect they deserve; and, finally, "encouraging the heart" involves the interpersonal aspect of leadership to reward and take care of the team. The conclusion in this case is straightforward in that the leadership challenge model and the Army Leadership Framework are based on the same basic tenets of leadership.


Figure 8: Leadership Model Comparison

The key point made with the emotional intelligence model is that many competencies other than pure intelligence or technical know-how determine whether a leader is successful or effective. The Army Leadership Framework supports the emotional intelligence leadership model in that it emphasizes so many elements other than the leader's mental attributes and the technical skills. It is apparent that self-awareness relates to the self-development principles of the Army leadership development model and that self-regulation addresses the Army leader's values and emotional attributes. Self-motivation can be aligned with duty and selfless service. Both social awareness and social skills involve interpersonal skills and influencing others. This understanding of the emotional intelligence leadership model makes it clear that the Army Leadership Framework, combined with the Army leadership development model, supports the notion that it takes much more than IQ to make a good leader.

The primary purpose of including a discussion of conventional business theory is to form a structured basis for important lessons learned from this study. Some key lessons learned and points to consider resulted from Peter Topping's research at the Bosch Corporation in 1995 and are summarized in Figure 9.

KEY COMPETENCY LESSONS LEARNED

➢ Involve the organization in the competency refinement effort.

➢ Develop competencies that are forward looking.

➢ Ensure the competencies are used to build leadership development.

➢ Develop an educational and experience based leadership development plan.

➢ Emphasize coaching, teaching, and mentoring as necessary leadership skills.

Figure 9: Key Competency Lessons Learned

The previous discussion, as well as the comparison of a few select conventional business leadership models with the Army Leadership Framework, indicates that the Army framework is contemporary in its basic design. The similar elements and concepts are best explained in the preface of FM 22-100 by the statement, "The Army Leadership Framework brings together many existing leadership concepts by establishing leadership dimensions and showing how they relate to each other." It is obvious that much effort was devoted to making the revised FM 22-100 a single-source reference for all Army leaders with the stated purpose of:

1. Providing leadership doctrine for meeting mission requirements under all conditions.

2. Establishing a unified leadership theory for all Army leaders: military and civilian, active and reserve, officer and enlisted.

3. Providing a comprehensive and adaptable leadership resource for the Army of the 21st century.

IV.   SURVEY AND INTERVIEW METHODOLOGY

A.   INTRODUCTION

The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ASA (ALT)), Military Deputy (MILDEP) tasked the Acquisition Support Center (ASC) to lead Army Acquisition Corps (AAC) transformation (ASC, 12 February 2006).   One of the 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap (ATR) initiatives being addressed by the ASC is the development of innovative and adaptive leaders who are comfortable operating as part of the Joint Force (U.S. ATR Summary, 2004).   The research team, with the goal of maximizing feedback and reviewable data, reached a cooperative agreement with the ASC to disseminate the survey questionnaire to the entire Army Acquisition Workforce (AAW).   In return, the research team will provide ASC with the survey results and the team's findings.

To ensure ease of use and timeliness, the team opted to conduct a web-based survey. The questionnaire was developed over a period of two months and beta-tested prior to notification. The ASC then communicated the survey website to the entire AAW via electronic mail notifications, along with the corresponding request to complete the survey. The link to the survey website was held active for two weeks. When the window did close, slightly fewer than 4,200 respondents, representing approximately nine percent of the AAW, provided input that became the baseline data for review. The screen shots of this survey and tables of the aggregated data are provided in Appendix A.

The survey was not designed to accept detailed opinions and lengthy responses, focusing instead on the identification of key core competencies needed by Army leaders in support of transformation objectives. To supplement the raw data and gain the objective feedback relevant for the team's research, a number of semi-structured interviews were also conducted. The personal interviews were

37

conducted with military and civilian leaders, both active and retired. The survey results and semi-structured interview findings are provided later in this report.

B. QUESTIONS

A primary goal of the research team was to gather as much relevant data as possible from which to conduct analysis. The external data collection efforts consisted of a researchers-developed, web-based survey and 13 semi-structured personal interviews. The following details the team's approach.

1. Web-Based Survey

The web-based survey was the preferred tool for implementation and was developed with time constraints and simplicity in mind. The research team conducted brainstorming sessions, literary research, and reviews of leadership programs to establish a wide assortment of leadership competencies. Special attention was given to ensure that the competencies selected for inclusion were leadership-related rather than managerial in nature. The team reviewed these competencies for redundancy and consolidated them where appropriate. The core leadership competencies included in the survey are found in Table 1.

2. Semi-Structured Personal Interview Questions

The semi-structured personal interviews were conducted with military and civilian leaders, both active-duty and retired. The interview questions, which were provided prior to the interviews, were intended to not only be specifically addressed, but also to serve as points of departure to gain additional insights and perspectives regarding leadership challenges in support of Army Transformation.

The research team established the premise for the interviewees by pointing out that previous studies have identified substantial differences between civilian and military leadership competencies. The team also noted that the objective of

our research team was to identify the leadership competencies that Army civilians need in order to understand, embrace, and encourage transformative change in the Acquisition workforce. The personal interview questions were:

1. Are you aware of documented differences in competencies between Army civilian and military (Acquisition) leaders, does it matter, and why? (Follow on as appropriate)

2. What does Army Acquisition transformation mean to you, and what additional knowledge, skills, and abilities in particular are needed to accomplish the mandate of Army Transformation? i.e., which leadership competencies (civilian and military) are most needed and why?

3. What is your perception of the state of the current training and education system offered by the Army to civilian (Acquisition) leaders to prepare them to succeed in a transformed Acquisition system?

4. Our survey data indicates that a strong correlation exists among civilians and military as to which leadership competencies are deemed most important to successfully accomplish (Acquisition) transformation. Do you perceive a gap between civilian and military training and education efforts, and what would you recommend to senior executives?

ASSUMPTION OF RISK
BEING A COACH AND A MENTOR
BOTTOM LINE COMMUNICATION
BRIEFING SENIOR LEVEL PERSONNEL
BUILDING CONSENSUS
DEVELOPING A SENSE OF URGENCY IN OTHERS
DEVELOPING AND MAINTAINING A POSITIVE ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
DIRECTION/GOAL SETTING
EFFECTS OF HUMOR IN THE WORKPLACE
EMPLOYEE DEVELOPMENT
EMPOWERMENT IMPORTANCE AND TECHNIQUES
IMPLEMENTING CHANGE
IMPORTANCE OF EFFECTIVE LISTENING
KNOWLEDGE OF PERSONNEL POLICY (BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN)
NETWORKING
PERSUASION TECHNIQUES
POLITICAL AWARENESS
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
STRATEGIC THINKING
TEAM BUILDING
TECHNICAL COMPETENCY
TIME MANAGEMENT
UNDERSTANDING LEADERSHIP STYLE DIFFERENCES
UNDERSTANDING MOTIVATIONAL THEORY
UNDERSTANDING ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION
UNDERSTANDING THE ART OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
UNDERSTANDING THE POWER OF HIGH EXPECTATIONS

Table 1: Core Competency Selections for On-line Survey

V.   SURVEY RESULTS

This portion of the study analyzes the findings of the Army Acquisition Workforce (AAW) survey questionnaire. As previously noted, there are fundamental differences between the military and civilian training opportunities relating to leadership of soldiers and civilians. This study provides analysis and recommendations for Army leadership to establish skill sets for civilian leadership and then to provide opportunities to both military and civilian leaders to improve these capabilities.

Table 2 and Figure 10 represent the civilian workforce responses, subdivided into categories by rank, along with the percentage of the total civilian workforce responses. As noted, the majority of the responses are from GS-12s and GS-13s, with approximately 22% and 33%, respectively, responding.

Number	Civilian Rank	Percentage of Total
20	SES	0.53%
872	GS-12	23.28%
1302	GS-13	34.76%
575	GS-14	15.35%
417	GS-15	11.13%
560	Other	14.95%
3746		

Table 2: Civilian Rank

Figure 10: Civilian Rank

Table 3 and Figure 11 represent the active military workforce responses subdivided into categories by rank, along with the percentage of total active military workforce responses. As noted, the majority of responses are from O-4 (Major), with approximately 40% responding, and O-5 (Lieutenant Colonel), with approximately 28% responding.

Number	Active Military	Percentage of Total
79	0-3	18.29%
172	0-4	39.81%
119	0-5	27.55%
42	0-6	9.72%
1	0-9	0.23%
17	Enlisted	3.94%
1	W-3	0.23%
1	W-4	0.23%
432		

Table 3: Active Military Ranks

Figure 11: Active Military Ranks

Table 4 represents the civilian workforce respondents' certification levels. The preponderance of the civilian workforce respondents that indicated a certification level were certified in Acquisition Logistics, Program Management, and Contracting. The majority of those respondents were certified in Program Management at Level II and Level III.

| Level I		Level II		Level III		Area
132	33.25%	44	15.22%	50	14.25%	**Acquisition Logistics**
82	20.65%	77	26.64%	97	27.64%	**Program Management**
55	13.85%	50	17.30%	65	18.52%	**Contracting**
39	9.82%	38	13.15%	47	13.39%	**Test and Evaluation**
31	7.81%	39	13.49%	58	16.52%	**Systems Planning, Research, Development and Engineering**
21	5.29%	8	2.77%	12	3.42%	**Business, Cost Estimating and Financial Management**
16	4.03%	18	6.23%	9	2.56%	**Manufacturing, Production and Quality Assurance**
9	2.27%	7	2.42%	9	2.56%	**Purchasing**
7	1.76%	3	1.04%	1	0.28%	**Auditing**
5	1.26%	5	1.73%	3	0.85%	**Industrial/Contract Property Management**
397		289		351		

Table 4: Civilian Certification Levels

Table 5 represents the active military workforce respondents' certification levels. The greater part of the active military workforce respondents are Level I, Level II, and Level III certified in Program Management. This is an indication that Program Management is addressed early in the active military careers and that Program Management training may be lacking early on in civilian careers, as indicated in Table 4.

Level I		Level II		Level III		Area
30	22.90%	32	30.19%	39	43.82%	*Program Management*
28	21.37%	17	16.04%	18	20.22%	*Contracting*
22	16.79%	7	6.60%	6	6.74%	*Acquisition Logistics*
21	16.03%	18	16.98%	8	8.99%	*Test and Evaluation*
13	9.92%	18	16.98%	12	13.48%	*Systems Planning, Research, Development and Engineering*
6	4.58%	1	0.94%	4	4.49%	*Business, Cost Estimating and Financial Management*
3	2.29%	2	1.89%	0	0.00%	*Industrial/Contract Property Management*
3	2.29%	5	4.72%	1	1.12%	*Manufacturing, Production and Quality Assurance*
3	2.29%	5	4.72%	1	1.12%	*Purchasing*
2	1.53%	1	0.94%	0	0.00%	*Auditing*
131		106		89		

Table 5: Active Military Certification Levels

Table 6 and Figure 12 represent positions held by all military and all civilian respondents. The majority of the total respondents are in positions within Technical Organizations and Business Support Organizations.

Number	Position	Percentage of Total
1038	Bus Sup Org	24.84%
96	DPM	2.30%
108	Ops Org	2.58%
488	Other	11.68%
221	PM	5.29%
91	PEO	2.18%
245	Program Office Staff	5.86%
411	Res Org	9.84%
109	OSD HQ	2.61%
1371	Tech Org	32.81%
4178		

Table 6: Total Respondents Positions

Figure 12: Total Respondents Positions

Figure 13 represents the most important knowledge areas as ranked by all respondents. The top five competencies considered most important by all respondents were: 1) Team Building, 2) Direction/Goal Setting, 3) Importance of Effective Listening, 4) Persuasion Techniques, and 5) Coaching.

Figure 13: Total Responses - Most Important

Figure 14 represents the areas in which all respondents have received training. The top five were: 1) Professional Ethics, 2) Team Building, 3) Importance of Effective Listening, 4) Understanding Leadership Style Differences, and 5) Technical Competency.

Total Responses - Received Training

Figure 14: Total Responses - Received Training

Figure 15 represents the areas in which all respondents feel they need further training. The five most common answers were: 1) Understanding the Art of Conflict Resolution, 2) Strategic Thinking, 3) Understanding Motivational Theory, 4) Direction/Goal Setting, and 5) Being a Coach and Mentor.

Figure 16 represents the most important competencies as ranked by civilian and active military workforce respondents. The civilian and active military workforce ranked the same top six competencies as being the most important: 1) Team Building, 2) Direction/Goal Setting, 3) Importance of Effective Listening, 4) Professional Ethics, 5) Being a Coach and Mentor, and 6) Strategic Thinking. It is interesting to note that civilians ranked Importance of Effective Listening higher than the active military did, while the active military

ranked Strategic Thinking higher. The remaining competencies shown in Figure 16 indicate that civilians and active military view them as very close in "most important" ranking.

Figure 15: Total Responses - Need Training

Figure 16: Civilian vs. Active Military - Most Important

Figure 17 represents the training received by civilian and active military workforce respondents. The top five competencies in which the civilian and active military workforces have received training were: 1) Professional Ethics, 2) Team Building, 3) Understanding Motivational Theory, 4) Understanding Leadership Style Differences, and 5) Technical Competency.

Figure 17: Civilian vs. Active Military - Received Training

Figure 18 represents the need for training as ranked by civilian and active military workforce respondents. According to the civilian respondents, the top five competencies for which training is needed were: 1) Understanding the Art of conflict Resolution, 2) Strategic Thinking, 3) Understanding Motivational Theory, 4) Direction/Goal Setting, and 5) Knowledge of Personnel Policy. According to the active military workforce, they were: 1) Understanding the Art of Conflict Resolution, 2) Strategic Thinking, 3) Being a Coach and Mentor, 4) Empowerment Importance and Techniques, and 5) Direction/Goal Setting.

Figure 18: Civilian vs. Active Military - Need Training

VI. SURVEY ANALYSIS

This section of the paper analyzes the survey data and makes noteworthy observations. The research team was extremely satisfied with having nearly 4,200 respondents to the on-line survey, as this yielded considerable data. The data presented in the previous section of this paper focused on only one aspect of the results—i.e., the core competencies deemed important to supporting Army Transformation.

Job category differences contributed additional useful survey results. For instance, the data revealed certain common trends in what civilian and active military Program Executive Officers (PEOs) considered the most important leadership categories. Common to both groups were the areas of Team Building, Direction/Goal Setting, Developing/Maintaining a Positive Organization, and Coaching/Mentoring. The exceptions to the commonalities were those of Understanding Motivational Theory for active military and Employee Development for civilans. It is interesting to note that, perhaps, the culture of the two institutions influences responses concerning these two exceptions. For active military, who work in an environment in which advancement hinges on career performance, the art of motivating employees is considered more important than employee development. It appears that the difference may be due to military leaders' (Officers') evaluations, which are driven by their current effectiveness. Those, in turn, are dependent on their subordinate's efficiency. A civilian leader is also evaluated by performance, but the delineating difference is that the civilian leader will not be forced out of a job due to a lack of exceptional performance, whereas, the active military leader will. With that in mind, culturally, a civilian leader has the luxury of emphasizing an employee's long-term career development, even though this emphasis will not provide immediate feedback to the civilian leader. The lack of positive and direct feedback to the active military

leader will negatively affect his/her chances of receiving the requisite successful evaluation and required career progression.

The survey analysis indicated additional differences between civilian and active military in the area of training still required. Out of the top five most important areas identified as requiring training, only two areas were common to the two categories of leaders. The PEO's active military and civilian leadership counterparts found that each needed additional training in Direction/Goal Setting and Understanding Motivational Theory. The differences between the two may also illustrate cultural differences between leadership categories. The PEO's active military leadership believed that additional training was required for Employee Development, Team Building, and Importance of Effective Listening. The PEO's civilian leadership identified additional training required in the areas of Persuasion Techniques, Implementing Change, and Understanding the Art of Conflict Resolution. Implementing Change, as it applies to civilian leadership, is discussed in much greater detail later in this paper.

Active military and civilian personnel agreed that the following areas are most important for the leadership position of Project Manager (PM): Direction/Goal Setting, Professional Ethics, Team Building, Strategic Thinking, and Empowerment Importance and Techniques. Once again, for areas in which personnel were already trained, this particular job category demonstrated the most commonality between active military and their civilian counterparts. The five areas of agreement in the category "training already received" were: Professional Ethics, Team Building, Understanding Motivational Theory, Knowledge of Personnel Policy, and Technical Competency. This indicates that, having received similar training, both military and civilian PMs consider the same competencies most important to executing the position.

Another aspect of the survey results worth examining is the type of personnel and positions that took the time to respond. The bulk of Active Military respondents were 0-3s (Captains), 0-4s (Majors), 0-5s (Lt. Colonels), and 0-6s

(Colonels)—in effect, the preponderance of leadership for the Active Military. Similarly, the majority of Civilian survey respondents were GS-12s, GS-13s, GS-14s, and GS-15s, basically the equivalent counterparts of the active military survey respondents. These two groups of respondents provided an excellent cross-section of leadership experience for the survey and, as such, allowed the research team to identify commonalities and differences between civilian and active military leadership competencies.

While assessing the overall response to the survey, the team identified certain trends in what "it took" to execute effective leadership. These trends could best be described as leadership qualities that draw out the will of personnel to buy into the mission and support it to a successful conclusion. As noted above, the rank/grades of the respondents comprising core leadership positions seem to indicate that the ability to effectively communicate, in whatever form, is such a key precept that it almost supersedes all other areas of leadership. The trend denotes that the respondents in leadership positions, both active military and civilian, consistently identified the following qualities as important: Providing Direction/Goals, Team Building, Being a Coach/Mentor, Effective Listening, and Persuasion Techniques. Although many other leadership areas were considered important to mission success, communication and its derivatives have, without fail, demonstrated an across-the-board survey trend.

A closer look at the respondents' comments offers an interesting perspective on successful leadership areas. The following phrases were the most commonly repeated in the respondents' comments:

1. Clear communication (avoiding miscommunication/misinterpretation)

2. Effective listening, bottomline communication

3. Direction/goal setting

4. Employee development/empowerment, being a coach and mentor

5.   Team building, motivating people, and simple human interaction

6.   Professional ethics

7.   Individuals assuming leadership positions with no people skills

Interestingly enough, one of the least mentioned leadership areas was that of Technical Competency. This is not to say that technical competency is to be downplayed as a key leadership area; however, the area that received the most emphasis was successful communication and interaction with others.   One respondent made an unusual, but discerning, observation: "I am a manager . . . not a leader. As a manager, I believe my success is due to being highly competent and organized." This statement reflects a significant difference between "leadership" qualities and "managerial" traits.

VII. SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

A. BACKGROUND

The semi-structured personal interviews were conducted with civilian and military leaders, both active-duty and retired. The interviewees were a composite of senior civilian leaders and military officers including Senior Executive Service (SES) members. Several interviewees were retired military and are currently supporting DoD/Army acquisition efforts. The interview questions were provided prior to the interview to allow the interviewee to be prepared to provide more in-depth analysis and evaluation of the civilian leadership issues. The template and questions are found in Appendix B. These questions were intended to not only be specifically addressed, but also to serve as points of departure to gain additional insights and perspectives regarding leadership challenges in support of Army Transformation.

The research team established the premise for the interviewees by noting that previous studies have identified substantial differences between civilian and military leadership competencies. The team also noted that our objective was to identify core leadership competencies needed by Army civilians to understand, embrace, and encourage transformative change in the Acquisition workforce. The semi-structured personal interview questions were:

1. Are you aware of documented differences in competencies between Army civilian and military (Acquisition) leaders, does it matter, and why? (Follow on as appropriate)

2. What does Army Acquisition transformation mean to you, and what additional knowledge, skills, and abilities in particular are needed to accomplish the mandate of Army Transformation? i.e., which leadership competencies (civilian and military) are most needed and why?

3. What is your perception of the state of the current training and education system offered by the Army to civilian (Acquisition) leaders to prepare them to succeed in a transformed Acquisition system?

4. Our survey data indicates that a strong correlation exists among civilians and military as to which leadership competencies are deemed most important to successfully accomplish (Acquisition) transformation. Do you perceive a gap between civilian and military training and education efforts, and what would you recommend to senior executives?

A total of 13 semi-structured interviews were conducted, garnering several distinct and common themes. The most notable themes were: 1) significance of leadership experiences; 2) reinforcement of the core leadership competencies perceived as most important; and 3) cultural differences between military and civilian perspectives towards leadership.

Each of the aforementioned questions is addressed in the following paragraphs and supports the conclusions and recommendations made in this paper. A limited sample of transcribed interviews is provided in Appendix C. These examples were selected as they generally represent the span of feedback and are indicative of the various viewpoints, particulary the contrasting views that are pervasive among civilians and their military counterparts. The transcripts are from interviews with one life-long civilian with no active-duty military experience, one active-duty military officer, one retired military officer who is now an Army civilian employee, and one former military officer now working for private industry and supporting the Army as a defense contractor.

B.   DISCUSSION OF RESPONSES

1.   Question One

This section evaluates and highlights several of the key findings in response to the first open-ended question of the semi-structured interview. The interview question was:

Are you aware of documented differences in competencies between Army civilian and military (Acquisition) leaders, does it matter, and why? (Follow on as appropriate)

The majority of interviewees were not aware of specific documented differences in competencies, although the generally held opinion was that differences did and do exist. The military respondents were much more assertive in their view that differences exist, while civilian respondents tended to agree in principle. Several interviewees knew of documented differences, but were less confident regarding which specific leadership competencies were identified as being dissimilar. Participants generally agreed that Army civilian leadership training was much less emphasized when compared to the military curriculum, and this may be a contributor to those documented differences described in the ATLDP assessment.

All interviewees elaborated on the relative importance of leadership training and its corresponding impact on effective leadership. Those with military experience commented on the effectiveness of such focused and deliberate leadership development programs. The civilian respondents acknowledged the importance of leadership training, while, at the same time, noting that the civilian component of the AAW/AAC has traditionally been function-based. Put in other terms, the majority of civilian respondents, and especially those with no military experience, reinforced the notion that long-term technical and/or institutional knowledge was the civilian ingredient to Army Acquisition rather than leadership, per se. This contrasting perspective is expanded upon later in this section.

Some interviewees felt that the differences in competencies did matter, while others did not. The majority of those who felt it did matter had military service experience—i.e., those who have experienced leadership development opportunities uniquely specific to the active-duty military. This perspective applied to both active-duty and retired military respondents. A majority of

civilian interviewees expressed a differing opinion, commenting that even if there were differences, the two were relatively indistinguishable. Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Bill Owens (Ret-N) supports this contrasting perspective: "The military does a very nice job of training leaders, but civilian society doesn't." He also has remarked that, in many cases, civilian organizations do not even realize that leadership is lacking (Williams, 2000). It is noteworthy that both of the above assertions were supported by the findings from the semi-structured interviews.

Most of the interviewees commented on the dynamic instabilities associated with the shorter-term (e.g., two to three years for a Program Manager or even less for junior and mid-grade officers) military leadership rotations and their contrast with the steady-state nature of civilian leadership (longer tenure in a leadership position such as civilian program manager, deputy program manager, functional/division leadership, etc.). Those who commented on this situation also noted that the fundamental differences between military and civilian leadership are embodied in this approach. Put differently, civilian respondents associated this fact with the need for civilian stability, while military interviewees pointed to this as a leadership developmental tool. Although all appear to agree that diversity of leadership experiences is a factor for leadership development, this may be an indication that existing civilian leadership continues to strongly oppose initiatives that support diversity in civilian leadership experiences and assignments. One interviewee remarked, "You think it is a gut instinct (the action of leadership), but it all boils down to experience. . . . So what you think is a gut reaction is really based on experience and what you have been through and what you have seen. Then you get an inkling of the way to go." The subject of leadership experience is discussed in more detail in the following paragraphs and in other areas of this research paper.

The active and retired military interviewees generally indicated that cultural differences exist between the military doctrine of leadership development

(i.e., that soldiers are constantly trained for leadership by rotational assignments and the subsequent exposures to various leadership experiences) versus the functional/discipline-based training approach so prominent among civilians (e.g., chief engineers, chief logisticians, etc.). These cultural differences have been widely studied and documented. References that identify, investigate, and report on the cultural differences include works by the Triangle Institute for Strategic Studies (Project on the Gap between the Military and Civilian Society, no date) and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Press (Soldiers and Civilians; The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security, 2003). The functional focus of the civilian culture makes it more difficult to embrace the ever-changing and diverse opportunities planned, provided, and, more often than not, required for their military counterparts. One military officer commented that recent attempts to exploit civilian leadership for growth through the mechanism of a mobility agreement met with so much resistance by the civilian workforce that concessions from the Army were necessary. (Army leadership has formally retracted the Mobility Agreement requirement (ASA (ALT), 08 May 2006) for most Army Acquisition Corps members).

A common civilian retort that illustrates these different perspectives was that private industry follows a functional discipline theory of operation much like that of the civilian acquisition workforce; therefore, the civilian paradigm need not be affected. In fact, much has been documented regarding how the contrasting perspectives between civilians and military lead to the inability to correlate Defense acquisition to private industry (Willis, 2001). One civilian respondent pointed out that some foreign military acquisition officers occupy a single position or rank for much more time than their counterparts in our Army. Contrasting perspectives such as this indicate that the cultural differences between military and civilian attitudes towards Army Acquisition leadership development may act as a barrier to improving Army civilian leadership development. The research clearly indicates that these cultural differences do, in fact, exist.

The perceived differences between military and civilian leadership competencies varied between military and civilian respondents. Most military leaders emphasized that the military's leadership advantage resulted in a better and more efficient fighting force, whereas the civilian respondents emphasized the functional nature of the acquisition workforce and its need to maintain functional expertise. The civilian respondents generally defended the differences by noting the specific missions of each and their seemingly mutual indifference. The military doctrine is to train leaders, while the civilian charter is to develop, field, and sustain military equipment and services. While it is arguable that fundamentally different missions do or do not exist, this does not provide adequate support in defense of the inability of the Army to train its acquisition workforce in the areas of required leadership competencies. The debate centers on whether the civilian or military model of leadership development should be adopted as the single preferred approach. Either option, or possibly a hybrid approach, has fiscal ramifications and should be considered as a possibility for future research.

2. Question Two

The second question of the semi-structured interview focused on the term "Army Transformation" and asked the interviewee to discuss different leadership areas of interest related to Army Transformation. The follow-up portion of the question focused on identifying core competencies and other related skill sets needed by civilian leadership in order to understand, embrace, and encourage transformative change in the Army. The second question was:

> What does Army Acquisition transformation mean to you, and what additional knowledge, skills, and abilities in particular are needed to accomplish the mandate of Army Transformation? i.e., which leadership competencies (civilian and military) are most needed and why?

There was a wide range of responses with respect to the definition of Army Acquisition Transformation. These viewpoints included the intent to overhaul and revamp the Army and/or DoD acquisition process(es); the transition to a primarily civilian-led acquisition process; a concerted effort to move towards the Future Combat System (FCS) approach to warfare (vice the emphasis on our current 'heavy' force); and the blurring of the service elements (Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps) such that one single DoD (often referred to as 'purple') has complete and focused control. While all viewpoints may be considered valid, no consensus as to exactly what Army Acquisition Transformation represents or intends to accomplish emerged from the interviews.

All the interviewees regarded Army Acquisition Transformation as involving some sort of change or conversion. All also attempted to define the change or conversion with an intended outcome, such as being 'purple' or migrating towards a groundswell of civilian acquisition leadership. While there was a unanimous opinion that the Army needs to change, there was not unanimity as to what the end state will or should be. One particular response from a retired military officer aptly and succinctly summarizes the array of responses: "I'm a big believer that Transformation has been poorly defined across [the] Department of Defense."

The second part of this interview question was intended to identify specific core competencies required by civilian leaders to effectively lead the Army through this Transformation, recognizing that Transformation means many different things to different people. The intent of this part of the question was very similar to that of the on-line survey; however, no bounds or predefined limits were used to establish acceptable responses.

Several key core competencies emerged as generally necessary, although a wide range of responses were received and many different competencies suggested. The three leadership competencies most often cited by the

interviewees as essential to the execution of Army Acquisition Transformation were: 1) communication, 2) change management, and 3) team-building. The competency areas of communication and team-building correlate quite well with the survey results showed in Figures 13 and 16. The notable exception is the change management core competency and that is further addressed in the following paragraph. These results are neither entirely unexpected nor inconsistent with prior efforts similar to this research paper. For example, the team-building competency has previously been identified as a fundamental skill domain for military leaders (TIP Database, 2006).

The subject of change management was not ranked as high as the other two competencies (communication and team-building), as Figures 13 and 16 show. The identification of this core competency as one of the four core competencies of the proposed National Security Personnel System (NSPS) (DA NSPS Workforce Briefing, 2006) indicates two things: this area may be receiving greater attention among Army leadership, and its relative importance is underappreciated by or underemphasized to the current acquisition workforce. As a result of the potential transition towards NSPS, recently implemented training opportunities are positive steps towards the indoctrination of the civilian workforce in the change management core leadership competency.

3. Question Three

The third question of the semi-structured interview focused on the assessment of the current state and/or availability of leadership training needed by civilian leadership to understand, embrace, and encourage transformative change in the Army. The question was:

What is your perception of the state of the current training and education system offered by the Army to civilian (Acquisition) leaders to prepare them to succeed in a transformed Acquisition system?

Most interviewees remarked that while the current state and availability of civilian leadership training has been much improved, it has yet to rival the availability (and, to a large degree, required or at the least expected) for military leadership. Specific leadership training opportunities—such as the Army Management Staff College's (AMSC) Sustaining Base & Leadership Management (SBLM) program, the Competitive Development Group (CDG), the Defense Leadership and Management Program (DLAMP), and myriad certification opportunities provided by the Defense Acquisition University (DAU)—all provide leadership development opportunities for prospective Army civilian leaders. Most respondents noted that many more such opportunities exist than most civilians may be aware of and that the available training has not been secured for potential civilian leaders due to the failure of current Army leadership, both military and civilian, to emphasize civilian leadership training.

Several issues were cited that call into question the effectiveness of these training opportunities. Examples of these issues varied, yet a couple of prominent themes emerged from the semi-structured interviews. Most military (active-duty and retired alike) commented that the civilian leadership programs did not "pull" from the civilian population, whereas the military approach did. For example, the Command & General Staff College (CGSC) may educate on the order of 50 percent of all military serving in the Acquisition Corps, yet the percentage of civilians attending any one of the aforementioned leadership training programs is considerably less. Another issue cited by most interviewees was the resident nature of such leadership training and the perceived negative civilian culture regarding lengthy tenures away from home and work. One respondent contrasted the military and civilian approaches and concluded that the civilian leadership emphasis is on the individual employee, whereas military leadership training/development emphasis is much more directed to the service member's chain of command.

One recurring point from most military respondents and echoed by several of the civilian interviewees was that no structured model or required training path exists for potential civilian PMs. There were several references to a perceived dichotomy. While civilian technical positions have certification requirements, no such comparable requirement exists for PM positions being staffed or to be staffed by civilians. There is indeed a Program Management acquisition field with associated certification requirements, but the vast majority of military respondents felt that to be function-based training and emphasized that it was not experience-based. The discussion asserting their basis for this perspective ultimately and repeatably returned to the relevance of the diversity of leadership experiences.

4. Question Four

The fourth question of the semi-structured interview focused on the relative importance of the core leadership competencies needed to understand, embrace, and encourage transformative change in the Army and what solutions, if necessary, the Army should study, pursue, and/or implement. The question was:

> Our survey data indicates that a strong correlation exists among civilians and military as to which leadership competencies are deemed most important to successfully accomplish (Acquisition) transformation. Do you perceive a gap between civilian and military training and education efforts, and what would you recommend to senior executives?

The key core competencies required to accomplish the mandate of Army Transformation varied from one interviewee to the next, for reasons based on the discussion above. Generally speaking, and consistent with the survey data, competencies such as Direction/Goal Setting and Team Building were identified as core leadership competencies. Interestingly, and also consistent with the survey data, Change Management consistently received less emphasis by civilian leaders

as compared to military leaders. Military respondents often remarked that change management is a basic tenet, with one respondent remarking that Transformation is "leading change into the future." These findings are consistent with the survey, as shown in Figure 17. These data represent a potentially fundamental difference in opinion between civilian and military personnel as to any specific leadership tools required to understand, embrace, and encourage transformative change.

A few of the respondents noted that there did not appear to be a single "standout" leadership core competency that emerged from the data. While it is shown that several competencies were notably more important than others, lack of any clear key core competency(ies) led some to conjecture that leadership was a composite of attributes, some of which may not be developed in an academic setting. Eisenhower's key leadership elements note that everyone has some innate leadership ability (Tyler Institute, no date). Although outside the scope of this thesis, the contribution of this (theoretical) innate ability to the education and training of the core competencies needed to ensure success of Army Transformation should be considered for further research.

Most interviewees expressed positive viewpoints regarding Army training efforts, especially the technical/functional opportunities available to the civilian workforce. Several responses, predominately from those with military experience, suggested that the Army should take a more proactive approach to civilian leadership training, making it as available as the technical/functional opportunities currently are. Several interviewees suggested a leadership functional area with associated certification levels. This thesis team fully supports that approach. Further research is necessary to determine what educational and experiential requirements should be established for the corresponding certification levels, should the Army (or even the DoD) pursue such a solution.

C. SUMMARY

One of the four key competency areas identified by the NSPS for effective leadership in support of Army Transformation is effective leadership for change. The survey responses did not identify this competency as one of the more important ones in understanding, embracing, and encouraging transformation efforts. This applied to both military and civilian responses. It is of particular interest to note that the military survey respondents did place more emphasis on the need for training in this particular competency than did the civilian respondents. The semi-structured interviews reinforced the importance of understanding, appreciating, and implementing required training to address the constantly changing environment.

A large majority of the interviewees did indicate that leadership development for the future Army civilian leadership has received a great deal of attention, and they agreed that this attention was previously underemphasized. Leadership development training currently being provided by the NSPS efforts, the Defense Acquisition University (DAU), and various other resources have unquestionably raised awareness of the importance of leadership training and its significance to the Army's current and future civilian leadership. Most of the interviewees felt that the Army was effecting positive change and that the Army must continue to emphasize the relevance and significance of such focused leadership training. In light of fiscal constraints, the obvious challenge is how such a focused civilian leadership training effort will be implemented and executed.

The semi-structured interviews also identified several potential core competencies that were not part of the on-line survey. The most advocated and widely accepted leadership competency not specified in the survey was diversity of leadership experiences as a result of varying job assignments and experiential training. While most interviewees agreed that this diversity is a key leadership competency, implementation of a program required to provide that diversity of

leadership experiences for the civilian acquisition workforce would be inadequate to meet the needs of Army Transformation. To further compound the issue, the existing cultural differences between the military and civilian workforce may be acting as a hindrance to such a solution.

The interviewees generally reinforced the findings from the nearly 4,200 responses to the on-line survey: two core competencies needed by the civilian leadership and required for successful Army Acquisition Transformation are communication and team-building. The competency of change management received much broader recognition from the semi-structured interviews than from the on-line survey. The area of change management has become increasingly visible, and its identification as one of the four cornerstones of the DoD NSPS program only serves to underscore its importance. Change management must continue to be emphasized to ensure that the present and future civilian leadership values its utility and necessity.

The state of the current Army training and education system to prepare civilian (Acquisition) leaders to succeed in a transformed Acquisition system is, by and large, quite healthy and beneficial. The number of opportunities available to civilians continues to increase in quantity and quality. Civilians and military strongly agreed that the systems currently in place far exceed the opportunities available a decade ago. The concern expressed by many is that the training and education system for civilians depends on the aggressiveness and proactive nature of given civilians, unlike the "draw" system in place for the military. The military doctrine values the diversity competency enough to force the rotation, and DoD and DA should strongly consider that approach.

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VIII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

This section of the research paper summarizes the findings of the research team and addresses the statistical significance of the survey. It also presents conclusions drawn from the detailed findings and analysis presented thus far. The research team has generated three specific recommendations, and the section concludes with suggestions for further study on this and related topics.

B. STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE

1. Confidence Level of the Leadership Survey

An important aspect of any survey involves the significance of the data with respect to how well the sample data represents the total population. In this case, the survey response of 4,178 is the sample or subset of the total Army Acquisition Workforce. During the conduct of the survey, the total population of the acquisition workforce was approximately 48,000, as reported by the Strategic Communications Director, U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center. Thus, the population subset represents an 8.7% sample of the total population of 48,000. Figure 19 depicts the sample as compared to the total population.

While the response rate of roughly 9% may seem low, the team had several objectives to consider in the design and delivery of the survey. First, the team wanted to design the survey in such a way as to minimize the time needed to complete the survey and, secondly, to minimize the time the survey was available on the Internet site. The goal was to collect valid, usable data, but not to unnecessarily burden the workforce. Any survey requires a tradeoff between the costs of the data collection and maximizing the confidence that the data are

representative of the total population. The team viewed the cost of the survey as how much burden we were willing to place on the acquisition workforce. Consequently, the team did not pursue typical survey methods to boost response rates, such as advance notification of the survey or follow-up communications.

Army Acquisition Workforce

43,822
91%

4,178
9%

Survey Responses

Figure 19: Survey Respondents as Percentage of AAW

The following sections discuss the level of confidence achieved, based on a simple statistical relationship between the survey responses relative to the total Army acquisition workforce population.

2. Statistical Significance

The word "significant" means important to most people. However, in statistics "significant" means probably true and not due to chance (Creative Research Systems, 2000). A finding may be statistically significant (probably

true), but not necessarily important. For the purposes of this survey, the level of significance is defined in terms of confidence intervals and confidence levels, as discussed in the following sections.

3. Confidence Intervals

Confidence intervals are plus or minus ranges typically seen in political polls. If you have a confidence interval of 3 and 45% vote for candidate "X in your sample data, then you can be relatively sure that if the total population were queried, between 42% (45% - 3%) and 48% (45% + 3%) would vote for candidate "X". How sure you are is defined as the confidence level.

4. Confidence Level

The confidence level is expressed as a percentage and represents how often the actual percentage of the population would select an answer within the confidence interval. In other words, if you have a 95% confidence level then you can be 95% certain that the true percentage of the population who will vote for candidate "X" lies between 42% and 48% (using the previous example with a confidence interval of 3). The two most common confidence levels are 95% and 99%, with most researchers using the 95% confidence level (Creative Research Systems, 2000).

5. Sample Size

One of the key factors that determines statistical significance and inversely affects confidence intervals and confidence levels is the size of the sample relative to the total population. However, contrary to what one might think, the relationship is not linear. If a sample size is doubled, the confidence interval does not decrease by one half. A simple way to put it is that a larger sample size will produce diminishing effects on the significance or accuracy of the survey.

6. Calculated Confidence Intervals

The confidence interval can be easily calculated with a known population for either a 95% confidence level or a 99% confidence level (Creative Research Systems, 2000). Since most researchers use a 95% confidence level, this team selected the same. The results for a 99% confidence level are provided for comparison purposes only. Figure 20 illustrates the different plus or minus confidence intervals achieved under variable sample sizes with a population of 48,000. It should be noted that an increase in sample size has a diminishing effect on the accuracy of the collected data. Another interesting fact is that the typical media political poll uses a 95% confidence level with a 3% margin of error. For this survey, if the team emulated the political poll accuracy then a sample size of 1,000 would be required.

Confidence Intervals
Population = 48,000

Sample Size	Confidence Levels 95%	Confidence Levels 99%
100	9.79	12.89
500	4.36	5.74
1,000	3.07	4.04
2,000	2.15	2.82
4,178	1.45	1.91
8,000	1.00	1.32
16,000	0.63	0.83
32,000	0.32	0.42
48,000	0.00	0.00

Survey=☐

Figure 20: Calculated Confidence Interval

7. Conclusion

In their "SPSS Survey Tips," SPSS Incorporated, a leading provider of predictive analytics software and solutions, state that there is usually no reason to survey more than 1,000 to 1,500 respondents. SPSS further states that, while the precision of results tends to improve as the sample size increases, the increase in precision is negligible when sample size is greater than 1,500 respondents (SPSS, 2004). One important aspect of determining an acceptable level of accuracy is the purpose of the survey. For example, if a corporation intends to invest millions of dollars based on the results of a survey or if potential safety or health implications are present, then researchers would naturally want extremely accurate sample data. For purposes of this survey and the construct of the survey, the team is satisfied with a 95% confidence that survey responses represent the total population with a plus or minus 1.45% accuracy. This represents twice the accuracy of typical media polls on approval ratings or voter preferences. Based on the above, the team concluded that the sample data collected are statistically significant and representative of the total acquisition workforce within acceptable accuracy limits.

C. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

As a result of the coupling of the survey analysis and the semi-structured interview responses, the team identified a strong correlation between the two. Without fail, the interviewees repeatedly stressed the same "Most Important" competencies that had shown up in the survey results: building the team/organization, providing direction/goals, listening to your people, and being a coach/mentor. As the various interview sessions indicated, the above competencies do not occur as a form of "management," but are considered "leadership" qualities.

To further elaborate on those intangible qualities of leadership, one only has to read through the interviews and compare them against the survey results. It is evident that civilians are being asked to perform in leadership positions without the requisite experience or cross-section of skills needed to execute. Both the survey and interviews revealed that there are substantial differences in leadership methodology and culture between military and civilian organizations. A common topic during the interviews was experience and what the military "forces" its future leaders to practice as they are coming up through the ranks. The military offers its future leaders one career path, in that "you will evolve, you will compete, and you will grow." If the junior military professional does not succeed along those lines, then that soldier's days are numbered in terms of promotion potential. Civilians, on the other hand, are not "forced" to do anything beyond the minimum professional career requirements, thus short-circuiting the pathways demanded in any interpretation of transformation. As gleaned from the interviews, to "lead" other people in the sense of organization, providing direction/goals, and helping shape future leaders through coaching and mentoring, a candidate must be exposed to meaningful leadership challenges early on, thereby giving him/her crucial experience on which to draw. If leadership is art and science gained primarily through actual experiences, then classroom "management" training alone is insufficient to optimize learning. In short, the climate of placing more and more civilians in leadership positions that were once occupied by military personnel is becoming increasingly difficult due to years of not affording civilians the opportunity to "learn" the necessary skill sets required for leadership.

An additional connection between the survey data and the interview findings involves the leaders' care of the organization. This was ranked high by survey respondents and also bluntly addressed during several interviews. One interviewee stated:

A leader takes care of an organization. I am the guy that provides resources and a vision. A leader's got to be able to provide you a vision of what your expectations or goals of where we want to go. And then it's my job to provide those folks that support the resources to get there. To me, that is what a key leader knows or has to know, he has to be able to identify and provide the vision, give them resources, and then identify those folks and what motivates them.

This quote alone identified approximately eight leadership competencies acknowledged by survey respondents as critical to effective leadership. This interview furnished real-life, proven experiences that positively supported what many survey respondents envisioned.

Another common recommendation gleaned from the interviewees related to the Army's commitment to a program to better train civilian leaders. The fiscal ramifications are enormous. If the Army is willing to do this early in a person's career, then naturally this may involve expending financial resources on some "potential" leaders who may not come to fruition. That risk is inherent in future leadership investment in any organization. Yet, the military culture appears to consistently invest early in its officers and enlisted personnel without necessarily receiving optimal outcomes.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS

The team has developed three recommendations as a result of the research performed, analysis conducted, and conclusions reached. It is anticipated that these recommendations, if implemented, will contribute to the Army's efforts to successfully undergo transformation, particularly in terms of civilian leadership.

1. Recommendation #1

A significant finding of this research team was that no specifically required or anticipated leadership development plan of action exists for Army civilians. While fiscal and other factors in implementing such a program are far-

reaching and beyond the scope of this research paper, the team recommends that a civilian leadership development program be defined. The program should address the findings of this research paper regarding core leadership competencies necessary for Army Transformation. Special emphasis should be placed on the subject of change management.

2. Recommendation #2

A recurring theme that resulted from this research paper was the drastically contrasting cultural perspectives of civilian and military leadership. Although the team focused on identifying core leadership competencies, it was readily apparent that these differing cultural perspectives could affect both the outcome of this paper and any other leadership implementation effort by DoD or DA. It is recommended that the Service continue to search for methods and activities centered on dissolving existing cultural barriers between civilian and military leadership—i.e., increasing contact between civilian and military leaders in decision-making processes.

3. Recommendation #3

Although the research team has recommended that the Army implement a focused and specific civilian leadership development program, we are aware of the myriad opportunities already in existence. The significance and the availability of these training and developmental opportunities appear to be neither well-publicized nor strongly supported by senior leadership. In order to effect immediate and positive change, it is recommended that the existing cadre of leadership development opportunities be reviewed and potentially mandated as a requirement for certain civilian leadership positions. Army leadership can support and reinforce the importance of these training opportunities. Uniformed and civilian leaders alike can adjust organizational climate factors to communicate clear expectations of the expanding roles and responsibilities of civilian leaders—

i.e., reward junior civilians with leadership potential by exposing them to and asking their opinions on command-wide problems. The documented gap between military and civilian cultures may exist for a reason and, therefore, may never be eliminated, but it can be mitigated under the compelling notion of one Total Force.

E.   SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

The research team has developed recommendations for futher study to enhance Army Transformation Leadership for tomorrow's Army civilian workforce. During the course of this research, areas of further research emerged on two fronts—one directly related to the topic of this paper and a second one related, but not directly, to the topic. The following paragraphs describe a few potential areas of future study and address both fronts.

The focus of this research team was the Army Acquisition Workforce, and its findings and recommendations are applicable to DA. It is recommended that the other services be similarly evaluated to determine to what extent the issues apply to the Army alone and to identify service-unique concerns. These evaluations coupled together would serve DoD as well.

It is suggested that interested agencies contrast and compare the current military and civilian leadership development models with a view toward implementing a civilian model. The core competencies required for Army Transformation, as outlined in this paper, could serve as the foundation for model development. The technical training models for Army civilians were widely regarded as effective. A leadership development model for Army civilians, to include certification levels and corresponding requirements, should be researched for potential implementation.

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APPENDIX A. SURVEY SCREEN SHOTS AND BACKUP DATA

The following pages provide screen shots of the web-based survey developed by the research team. To reiterate, the web-based survey was the preferred tool for implementation and was developed with time constraints and simplicity in mind. The research team conducted brainstorming sessions, literature research, and reviews of leadership programs to establish a wide assortment of leadership competencies. Special attention went to ensuring that the competencies selected for inclusion were leadership-related rather than managerial in nature. These competencies were reviewed for redundancy and consolidated where appropriate.

Question #6, depicted in the following screen shots, was modified during the course of the survey to allow for a manual entry of an acquisition field in the event that the desired field had not been provided. That update is not reflected in the following pages; nor does it detract in any way from the contents of this paper.

In addition to the on-line survey screen shots, the total consolidated survey response data are provided. These data are all data obtained from Section II of the on-line survey and form the basis for the conclusions regarding core leadership competencies needed by Army civilians to understand, embrace, and encourage transformative change in the Acquisition workforce.

Army Transformation Leadership Competencies Survey

Welcome to the Army Transformation Leadership Competencies Survey. This survey was developed by Joe Garcia, John Klingel, John Mull, Dennis Summers and Vickie Taylor. The purpose of this survey is to identify the key competencies needed to succeed as a civilian leader in the Acquisition Corps and then identify training gaps if they exist.

The information collected will provide army leadership with insight into possible gaps in leadership training in the civilian ranks. This information will be useful in developing a transformational approach to leadership training.

Your responses will be kept confidential. NO NAMES will be used in the final report. It is important to be as candid as possible to truly identify where changes need to be made in the current training approach of our civilian workforce.

Prior to taking this survey, we want to explain that leadership should not be confused with management. Management is comprised of three main tenets:

1. Planning and Budgeting
2. Organizing and Staffing
3. Controlling and Problem-Solving

Leadership however is a function of:

1. Direction Setting
2. Aligning Constituencies
3. Motivating and Inspiring

There are two parts to the survey.

Part I: Addresses the knowledge base you feel necessary to be a successful leader.

Part II: Addresses your professional background.

Please read the instructions carefully before answering any questions.

Next >>

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Army Transformation Leadership Competencies Survey

PART I - Professional Background

Please provide the following background information. It will be useful during the analysis of data collected in Part II

1. If military your current or retired **military rank**

Military Rank	Active	Retired
0-10	O	O
0-9	O	O
0-8	O	O
0-7	O	O
0-6	O	O
0-5	O	O
0-4	O	O
0-3	O	O
0-2	O	O
0-1	O	O
W-5	O	O
W-4	O	O
W-3	O	O
W-2	O	O
W-1	O	O
Enlisted	O	O
Not Applicable	O	

2. If civilian, your current **civilian grade or equivalent pay band:**

Executive Service (SES)	O
GS-15	O
GS-14	O
GS-13	O
GS-12	O
Other or Not Applicable	O

3. Your current **position:**

Program (Project/Product) Manager	○
Deputy Program (Project/Product) Manager	○
Program Office Staff	○
Service or OSD Headquarters Staff	○
Program Executive Officer/ PEO Staff	○
Technical Support Organization (systems engineering, logistics, manufacturing, T&E, etc.)	○
Business Support Organization (budgeting, contracting, cost-estimating, etc.)	○
Operational ("User") Organization	○
Research (Science & Technology) Organization	○
Other	○

4. How long have you served in government service including any military service

| 14 years ▼ |

5. Number of years of leadership experience (Team Lead, mentoring, etc)

| --Length of Service-- ▼ |

6. Your **certification** in acquisition career fields (check **all** that apply)

N/A	Level I	Level II	Level III	Acquisition Career Field
○	○	○	○	Program Management
○	○	○	○	Systems Planning, Research, Development and Engineering
○	○	○	○	Business, Cost Estimating and Financial Management
○	○	○	○	Test and Evaluation
○	○	○	○	Acquisition Logistics
○	○	○	○	Manufacturing, Production and Quality Assurance
○	○	○	○	Contracting
○	○	○	○	Purchasing
○	○	○	○	Industrial/Contract Property Management
○	○	○	○	Auditing

PART II - Knowledge Base

- Please follow these steps:
  1. In the first column, titled **"Most Important areas of knowledge to be successful as a leader"**, select 6 competencies (click on square) you think are most important to effective leadership.

  2. In the second column, titled **"Areas where you had already received classroom training"**, select all competencies (click on square) you already had training in.

  3. In the third column, titled **"Areas where additional training could have benefited you in your first leadership role"**, select all competencies (click on square) where you think additional training would have benefited you when you accepted your first leadership role.

- **Please insure you have identified exactly 6 in the first column.**

Knowledge Base	Most Important areas of knowledge to be successful as a leader (select only 6)	Areas where you have already received classroom training (unlimited)	Areas where additional training could have benefited you in your first leadership role (unlimited)
Networking	☐	☐	☐
Team Building	☐	☐	☐
Importance of Effective Listening	☐	☐	☐
Being a Coach and Mentor	☐	☐	☐
Understanding Leadership Style Differences	☐	☐	☐
Understanding the Art of Conflict Resolution	☐	☐	☐
Direction/Goal Setting	☐	☐	☐
Knowledge of Personnel Policy (both military and civilian)	☐	☐	☐
Implementing Change	☐	☐	☐
Understanding Organizational Communication	☐	☐	☐
Assumption of Risk	☐	☐	☐
Empowerment Importance and Techniques	☐	☐	☐
Employee Development	☐	☐	☐
Developing and Maintaining a Positive Organizational Culture	☐	☐	☐
Building Consensus	☐	☐	☐
Technical Competency	☐	☐	☐
Professional Ethics	☐	☐	☐
Persuasion Techniques	☐	☐	☐
Effects of Humor in the Workplace	☐	☐	☐
Effective Counseling/Evaluation	☐	☐	☐
Understanding Motivational Theory	☐	☐	☐
Political Awareness	☐	☐	☐
Bottom Line Communication	☐	☐	☐
Briefing Senior Level Personnel	☐	☐	☐
Developing a Sense of Urgency in Others	☐	☐	☐
Strategic Thinking	☐	☐	☐
Understanding the Power of High Expectations	☐	☐	☐

1. What do you view as the most important **knowledge area** for your success as a leader? Why?

2. Are there any other knowledge areas **not listed** in this survey that you would consider critical to being an effective leader?

If you have questions, please contact our web administrator at Dennis.Summers@us.army.mil

Again, thank you for taking the time to complete the survey that will benefit the acquisition workforce.

Submit Form   Reset Form

Total Responses - Most Important		
Number	**Area**	**Percentage of Total**
2304	**Team Building**	**9.26%**
2149	**Direction - Goal Setting**	**8.63%**
1887	**Importance Effective Listening**	**7.58%**
1705	**Persuasion Techniques**	**6.85%**
1458	**Coach**	**5.86%**
1402	Strat Think	5.63%
1349	Dev/Main Pos Org Cul	5.42%
1239	Tech Comp	4.98%
1178	Emp Dev	4.73%
1147	Empower Import and Tech	4.61%
1097	Under Art of Conf Res	4.41%
837	Impl Change	3.36%
797	Unders Org Comm	3.20%
760	Under Motivl Theory	3.05%
648	Unders Leadership Style Diff	2.60%
625	Briefing Sr Lev Pers	2.51%
585	Polit Aware	2.35%
569	Assump Risk	2.29%
561	Networking	2.25%
516	Knowl Person Policy	2.07%
365	Dev Sens Urg Others	1.47%
357	Buildi Consensus	1.43%
326	Bottom Line Comm	1.31%
315	Time Mgmt	1.27%
246	Pers Tech	0.99%
239	Unders Power of High Expect	0.96%
232	Effects Humor Work	0.93%
24893		

Total Responses - Already Trained In		Percentage of
Number	**Area**	**Total**
3143	**Professional Ethics**	**7.81%**
3095	**Team Building**	**7.69%**
2471	**Importance of Effective Listening**	**6.14%**
2464	**Understanding Leadership Style Differences**	**6.12%**
2140	**Technical Competency**	**5.32%**
1894	Understanding the Art of Conflict Resolution	4.71%
1731	Direction/Goal Setting	4.30%
1697	Understanding Organizational Communication	4.22%
1580	Implementing Change	3.93%
1580	Knowledge of Personnel Policy (both military and civilian)	3.93%
1566	Being a Coach and Mentor	3.89%
1532	Employee Development	3.81%
1515	Understanding Motivational Theory	3.76%
1433	Strategic Thinking	3.56%
1342	Empowerment Importance and Techniques	3.33%
1328	Time Management	3.30%
1286	Political Awareness	3.19%
1270	Assumption of Risk	3.16%
1200	Building Consensus	2.98%
1140	Developing and Maintaining a Positive Organizational Culture	2.83%
1011	Briefing Senior Level Personnel	2.51%
973	Networking	2.42%
807	Persuasion Techniques	2.00%
536	Understanding the Power of High Expectations	1.33%
527	Effects of Humor in the Workplace	1.31%
518	Bottom Line Communication	1.29%
472	Developing a Sense of Urgency in Others	1.17%
40251		

	Total Responses - Need Training	
Number	**Area**	**Percentage of Total**
1720	**Understanding the Art of Conflict Resolution**	**4.98%**
1634	**Strategic Thinking**	**4.73%**
1602	**Understanding Motivational Theory**	**4.64%**
1479	**Direction/Goal Setting**	**4.28%**
1466	**Being a Coach and Mentor**	**4.24%**
1464	Knowledge of Personnel Policy (both military and civilian)	4.24%
1446	Employee Development	4.19%
1414	Persuasion Techniques	4.09%
1405	Political Awareness	4.07%
1402	Developing a Sense of Urgency in Others	4.06%
1381	Developing and Maintaining a Positive Organizational Culture	4.00%
1376	Empowerment Importance and Techniques	3.98%
1302	Understanding the Power of High Expectations	3.77%
1298	Implementing Change	3.76%
1280	Understanding Organizational Communication	3.71%
1273	Time Management	3.69%
1229	Team Building	3.56%
1219	Bottom Line Communication	3.53%
1202	Importance of Effective Listening	3.48%
1195	Briefing Senior Level Personnel	3.46%
1176	Networking	3.40%
1133	Assumption of Risk	3.28%
1133	Building Consensus	3.28%
1122	Understanding Leadership Style Differences	3.25%
951	Effects of Humor in the Workplace	2.75%
728	Technical Competency	2.11%
508	Professional Ethics	1.47%
34538		

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APPENDIX B.   PERSONAL SURVEY TEMPLATE AND QUESTIONS

During the course of our studies, it was brought to our attention that previous studies have identified substantial differences between civilian and military leadership competencies. The objective of our thesis team was to identify leadership competencies needed by Army civilians to understand, embrace, and encourage transformative change in the Acquisition workforce.

The following questions helped our team identify leadership competencies and possible deltas between military and civilian leadership competencies:

1. Are you aware of documented differences in competencies between Army civilian and military (Acquisition) leaders, does it matter, and why? (Follow on as appropriate)

2. What does Army Acquisition transformation mean to you, and what additional knowledge, skills, and abilities in particular are needed to accomplish the mandate of Army Transformation? i.e., which leadership competencies (civilian and military) are most needed and why?

3. What is your perception of the state of the current training and education system offered by the Army to civilian (Acquisition) leaders to prepare them to succeed in a transformed Acquisition system?

4. Our survey data indicates that a strong correlation exists among civilians and military as to which leadership competencies are deemed most important to successfully accomplish (Acquisition) transformation. Do you perceive a gap between civilian and military training and education efforts, and what would you recommend to senior executives?

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APPENDIX C. SELECTED INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS

This appendix contains selected transcripts from several of the semi-structured interviews conducted by the research team. These are a cross-section of responses from civilian and military personnel and are provided to illustrate the contrasting perspectives discussed in the paper. The transcripts are from one life-long civilian with no active-duty military experience, one active-duty military officer, one retired military officer who is now an Army civilian employee, and one former military officer now working for private industry and supporting the Army as a defense contractor.

US Army Colonel, Project Manager

Question 1:

At one time I could probably answer this more specifically, but I studied a little bit of this, especially when I was a mid-grade officer. No, I am not specifically aware of specific documented differences or competencies. I had a general appreciation of differences. To a certain degree, you have to go back to how the Army runs or how the Army, and even the DoD, has organized itself to use military and civilian members of the force. Beyond operational differences (military leaders doing their thing in the field and the pure warfighting type skills), we have the leadership of people, specifically at the junior level, and at a higher level it still includes people but you becomes leaders of organizations as well as a leader of leaders function; training and development of people (members of the workforce) but also training and development of leaders as intermediate leaders. A little bit of difference there. In the field of warfighting, you still have those flavors but military officers are generally trained in a broad portfolio of skill sets (you might say a generalist of a certain sort) and civilians are trained to a certain depth of expertise. I wouldn't want to say specialists but they spend more time and drive their opportunities through deeper skill sets where the military tends to drive its officers into an appreciation of skill sets and some competency but then more skill sets if you will, a diversity of skill sets. Then you get into the acquisition world and you see how those skill sets are overlaid and when you get to courses such as the advanced PM course, that's where you see the difference. You see where the military and civilians come together and you realize that the military are exposed in their career development, you know having a junior officer, you're exposed to things like you see from some of the officers around here, what you see in the captains and majors, they spend some time working in logistics, they spend some time working in engineering, they spend some time working in test, they spend some time in a project office, they also spend some time outside of a project office working in contracts, they spend some time doing some IT work, so they get some measure of competency, but they're not the IT guru, they're not the test guru, they're not the log guru, but they have a measure of competency based upon some measure of knowledge and competency. And so when they're promoted and moved on to other organizations, they can then start to see how well the skill sets are blended. In the civilian world you tend to get a diversity of assignments within a career field if you will. So you have engineers who get deeper and broader into the engineering world, but maybe not so much in the log world or acquisition/contracting. But that's ok as long as all the skills are blended together, which is good. Now you get your senior leaders, whether they're military or civilian, you're trying to crash these guys together to work together. And when you notice the difference is when you're in an area where you are forced choices

such as the acquisition world trying to develop civilian PMs. Which is a little unsettling for some of the career fields for some of the civilians who have been in a career field where it is commonplace for them to be trained and developed and groomed to be directors of engineering or logistics or the Acquisition Center. Eventual RDEC leaders and the IMMC leaders, things like that. Now, the OSD is to pull back on the military complement of acquisition program management. It doesn't necessarily have to be a military person to be a PM. You guys (civilians) are doing it. But you have to have the skill sets. But when you have them compete for PM boards, what's the problem? We don't have enough civilians. Now you get back to the competencies. Most of those military have been trained to be able to handle and balance the portfolio of skill sets. Civilians have been trying to develop a portfolio of skill sets within a career field. So now you get into things like CDG, trying to develop civilians in other career fields, get exposed to that to have them more competitive for other career fields or to be a civilian PM.

Interviewer: So is it fair to say that you are not aware of a documented difference, per se, but fundamentally the two institutions vary in how they develop leaders.

Right. It all starts with what you expect a military leader to be and what you expect a civilian leader to be in this environment. On the one hand, the DoD is finding it somewhat expensive to have military people committed to the acquisition world, especially when they're trying to thin out the military out of the office environments if you will. And put their ratio of officers in line units. So who's going to backfill those leadership positions that the military has in the civilian/corporate world? Why can't they do it? They can do it. It's not a matter of can't do it, it's a matter of were they trained to do it? The military were. That's what the military does. They spend your life training and developing it and as soon as they get good at doing something, they go somewhere else. That's been the classic problem. As soon as they got comfortable with something, got great at something, it's time to move. And they keep doing it over, and over, and over. And after a while, you just get used to it and pick up the ball and run with it. You stay in your lane with the ball and just keep going. So why aren't the civilians doing that? Because they're doing what they're supposed to be doing. So that's the difference between the military and civilians and how they're trained and developed. We're getting better at it with the civilians. There have been things like the CDG. We have the DLAMP. We have these other various career developing programs to expose and get more of that broad expertise without pushing too far out of their lane, but also getting exposed so that they can compete more successfully in these other roles. But you also have to realize there is a certain measure of training development to be a PM as opposed to say a director of engineering or a director of log, director of acquisition/contracting or something like that.

Question 2:

Fundamentally, transformation is the adaptation of where we are today in anticipation, not in response, but in anticipation, of what we need to be doing and how we need to behaving in the environment we expect that will reveal itself when tomorrow becomes the present. Leading change into the future. It's one of those projecting yourself over the horizon and laying claim to what's going on out there and then coming back to the present and saying 'OK, here's what I need to be to be prepared for when the sun comes up and tomorrow becomes today is what I've got to be doing.'

Interviewer: An interesting data point from our survey results show that, given that transformation fundamentally means change, civilians we've spoken to don't like change (for example, the pushback from mobility statements) [Note, this interview was not conducted in the pre-ordered manner]. But one of the four core competencies/functional areas is change management. Does civilian culture and civilian academia associated with leadership not adequately address, change, change management, leadership in change for civilians?

That's correct.

Question 3:

I don't think it's gone nearly far enough. I think it's too shortsighted. It's like if you want to do that, you have to pursue consideration of the overhead to train the military, why wouldn't you have comparable overhead in training civilians? The CDG gets you that. The CDG offers a 3-year program to go and functionally be on a sabbatical for 3 years from your career field. But you're not prearranging, you're actually negotiating assignments that are complemented to your career field but gives you the opportunity to go try something entirely different. If you're a contracting person, you get to go work in a PM shop. You can do that for 6 months working with logistics, maybe working engineering. Now you have to realize you can't throw somebody in that has no clue what they're talking about but you can put them in an environment where they can get exposed and still provide value-added. The CDG folks have to be value-added. That exposure gives them a lot of benefit that will then be networked in with other benefits and other skill sets that they develop. Here's the other thing, mid-level career. The Army has a junior career development; they have junior schools (Officer Basic Course, Officer Advanced Course) that are line unit skill sets. They have the mid-career course (CGSC) that you go through and you refresh yourself on the way the Army runs. Everybody does it. It used to be competitive but maybe half would

go resident and basically take a year sabbatical to be in school for a year. And the others that didn't get selected had the opportunity for a non-resident slot. But the point is that everyone gets exposed to doctrines of how divisions operate, doctrines of how Corps operate, how the Army operated in the field, the Combat Arms, the logistician, the other services, that's when you start to expose everyone to how the Army and Air Force work together, how does the Army and Navy work together, what is joint, what is purple versus green or other colors of blue. You get exposed to these things and you start to think in a broader scheme. So that way, when you go into your future roles as a division officer, staff officer, or commander or future battalion commander/brigade commander, you say, you know, I'm part of the bigger picture. And I know how all of those things are kind of connected but maybe I'm not an expert at it, but I know there's something out there. I am exposed to the operational doctrine or the acquisition doctrine, resource management, maybe just basic finances, manpower management…you're exposed to all of that kind of stuff. You get all that as part of your mid-career school and in the military; it's deliberate to be quite honest with you. If you want to be a future leader, you have to be exposed to this. Because you have to be good at personnel management, human resources. You have to be good at your command budget. You have to be good at it. We didn't say you have to be an expert at it. Why? Because you have all these other experts in your shop. You can have a civilian who knows everything there is to know about finances. You can have a civilian who knows everything there is to know about contracts. You have to make sure they're oriented in the right direction and that they are appropriately staffed and resourced to go do their job and you have to make sure its blends together for a good outcome.

Interviewer: Isn't all that training available to all civilians?

It's a very thin slice. How many civilians go to the equivalent of CGSC? They have the SBLM, which now pulls them in. They didn't used to pull them in, they didn't used to. They also have the Army Management Staff College and they've gotten better over the years.

Interviewer: But the difference between the civilian and military activities is that no 'forcing function' exists on the civilian side.

That's part of the problem here. They are all opportunities. A lot of it is you have to self-nominate yourself. With the military, there is a 'draw' function. If you want to get promoted, you must go. Ninety percent of the lieutenant colonels went to CGSC resident program. It's one of those 'we're not going to make you go to CGSC' (although your assignments officer is going to assign you to CGSC); you have the opportunity to decline.

Interviewer: Why would you do that?

Exactly. It's one of those, if you want to get promoted, you're going to go. You know that. You can decline it, but you realize you probably might not get promoted. And if you are not promoted, you are on a timeline to get out of the Army. It's one of those 'that's the way it is'. It's not 'I'm doing a great job, why can't I be promoted to be a lieutenant colonel anyway?' As part of the career model, we expect the lieutenant colonels to know the stuff that the CGSC provides. We expect the brigade commanders to know the stuff that War College provides. Because they know what went into the school and they expect that stuff to be in your heads when you're in these various leadership positions. Why? Because they expect performance out of you. At that level. With those skill sets in mind because when they walk up to somebody they already know the kind of things you've been exposed to. So here are the problems I'm going to throw out at you. That's what senior leadership does. I'm throwing you to the front. I have an expectation that you are going to be able to handle it. You're going to be able to take the ball and run with it. Because guess what? Senior leadership has bigger problems. They have longer-term problems and they need someone to provide solutions, maybe an outcome. So, they're looking for help. So they're looking for everyone below them to pick up the ball and run with it. So, by design, military officers are put in the position that says 'if you want to be part of the future Army, you have to be promoted, and if you want to be promoted, you have to go to school, and if you want to go to school, you have to be good in your job performance, you have to indicate your initiative and motivation, you have to do the things that demonstrate you want to step up and move on, and if you do that, you'll be nominated for school, you'll be competitive for school, you'll get selected for school, go to school, get follow-on assignments that draw on that education…' It's just an iterative thing. It keeps going. But the officers know that if you step off the track, the track moves on and you don't. So here's the question, where is that in the civilian world? Where is that in civilian modeling? In the civilian modeling, it's more of a . . . it's been a hard thing to get our own leadership to make the offering. Now the next thing is that the Army and DoD did try to do things such as the Mobility Assignment. But there was pushback. See, that's part of the problem. The military, we can be told 'Let's see, today's Friday . . . you'll be in Kuwait Monday for 6 months.' We're in a role that has few responses (e.g., 'yes sir', 'do I have time to pack?'). Not 'Uh, you sure? Can I refuse to go to Kuwait?' But in the civilian world a response might be 'I don't think so'. And so part of that problem is with the civilian/career modeling and have they articulated the opportunities, but how much of a draw is there? As part of the military, we move and are exposed to different things and when you try to do that with the civilians, and of course we pay for that, the military, we pay for the cost to PCS, to move household goods, we pay for it. Does the Army do that for civilians? They do have programs to allow for that. But civilians have to **want** (emphasis mine) to move. But they also have to have the confidence that

after they move, they still have viable career growth/progression as part of the plan. So it's not just, and that's been part of the lack in the modeling, that if you have a civilian who competes for a PM and they do get accepted to PM, then they'll be PM for maybe 5 years instead of 3 years, something like that. Little bit longer, maybe 10 years. But the point is 'after PM, then what'? The Army has a hard time figuring out what they do. All of a sudden, it's 'well they did great as a PM, now what do we do with them?' Do we keep them as a PM forever and a day until they retire? You can do that in other jobs, or until the job gets redefined. But with the way the military does it, they are always rotating people through. The whole model is a population-development model. So where is the population-development model for the civilians? It's kind of funny that we rotate people in and out of PM shops, we rotate people in and out of staffs. Not only do we expect outcome from them, by being in the job it's a training opportunity for the next step. So we expect outcome but they're also being developed. Well, while they're doing that we've also got someone else so we want to move these guys on to go do the next step. And in the meantime we'll bring someone else to do the outcome and be developed. So every job is a developing opportunity for something else. In the meantime the Army's getting outcome. By doing that, not only are you training individuals, you're training the population. Where is that for the civilian workforce? Where is the population-development that will draw the individual into the model? Where is the Army saying 'I need future engineering leadership to train and develop junior engineers' for example. So how are we going to draw them in and make it that they want to make the moves? In engineering, it's a discipline, and I need someone who's skilled in electronic engineering/engineering for electronic systems as well as engineering for hardbodies (tanks, etc.) and engineering for sophisticated sensors and electronics you might find in a missile or helicopter. Do we have some program that takes engineers as part of their career model that takes them from, say, an RDEC or a program office that is in Huntsville and then take them to Warren to Ft. Monmouth and back to Huntsville? Is there anything like that that says 'Oh, so one day you might be integrating a missile onto a hardbody which is sophisticated electronics?' Somebody that's been three of those points on the triangle could probably say something like 'I know how to do that because I already figured out the problems in each of those skill sets and I know how to take advantage and mitigate the problems with the other guy's skill sets.' So you have some senior guy around here who says 'You, sensor guy, this is a complicated issue and you need to have that conversation with the hardbody guy and you need to have that other conversation with the sensors guy' and just pull it all together. Where is that? Whereas in the military we get exposed to that so I can say 'test guy, why aren't you talking to the engineer? The guy has a solution. You need to talk to him. And by the way, you two guys talk to the logisticians so that way you can solve his problem before he gets to it because, guess what, you need to consider his thoughts and issues in your design cause he's going to come back and

consume that problem later out in the field'. It's one of those kind of things where it's not hard to do when you're doing it; it's just that you got to think, it's got to be something that you've been exposed to that ought to be a part of the conversation. So where is the career modeling that gets you exposed you to different assignments that get you to naturally think in a broader, universal set while you're still simply working in your lane. You get somebody that has that exposure in their lane and someone who's never had that exposure who was always stove-piped in a single community and what they are doing on a day-to-day might look the same, but their impact is on a curve. The impact of the guy that has been exposed to more things and is competent and brings that into his job somehow, it seems to go better or there is a longer/more effective ranging effect. So 'why is that guy better'? They both have the same discipline, they're both equally competent, but one's been exposed to something a little more, a little differently, maybe not to the depth of the other guy. So that's when you have to manage the niches. Sometimes you do want someone who is deep. Deep as in the deepest mind in something cause they are the guys that, and they've got to love it, you've got allow them to get their conversations that their glad to do it and they're paid to have fun.

Interviewer: But that's specificity.

Exactly, but they would not be suited to be a chief engineer of a multi-disciplined office. But that goes back to where is the career modeling that takes these guys who haven't been exposed to broader things, trains and develop them to higher things? But of course part of that training and development they do realize the more you train and develop them in broader areas, the less deep you can go no matter how deep you want to. Now you get into, even in the military, we have to watch out for people that are excited about certain technological gains or guys that are operational. Some of the common failings if there's an issue. Sometimes it's the senior leader who remembers what it was like to be a little bit lower level and kind of gets in the knickers of the lower level leaders, that kind of thing. Starts getting into a micromanagement or interference problem. That's one of those challenges of self-discipline, organizational discipline. You get a brigade commander that wants to get in the battalion commander's business. No, you be the brigade commander and let the battalion commander do battalion commander stuff. Well, let the 0-6 PM do 0-6 PM stuff and let the 0-5 PM do his thing and provide oversight and tutelage to the 0-5 PM but let the 0-5 PM be an 0-5 PM. And for the chief engineer, let the yeoman engineer do his job. You know, provide some mentoring and some counseling and all that. The higher you go, the more you have to look for a total synthesis that everything is in balance and has a right direction.

Because the deeper you go into something, all of a sudden you get into somebody else's knickers and you're not paying attention, like if you're digging deep into the weeds, nobody's watching what's going on above. That's a big challenge.

<u>Question 4:</u>

Embedded in the above discussion.

Civilian Deputy to a PEO, SES

Question 1:

I think in the past that was probably true. What I think the issue is now, if there is an issue, is a failure to communicate over and over and make the civilian workforce aware of what's really available to them. It's a great deal. In my last position I had two guys at the same time working on their PhDs. All they had to do was get accepted and come ask. At that time we had a panel at the PEO level that reviewed things to see what was going on but it was a formality.

Interviewer: Is it fair to say that you are aware of differences? Does it matter?

I would say that 5-10 years ago, that was very true. I think those differences now are very isolated and I think the difference in where they are is the aggressiveness of the civilian to want the training because he knows he can survive in the job without the training where the military absolutely has to have it. So I think if the civilian is just as aggressive as the military and has a little patience, it's there.

Interviewer: So does it matter?

I don't think so.

Did you have trouble getting into this program?

Interviewer: No, if I had my own checkbook. My case is interesting in that I was not board selected but was sponsored by ASC assuming my project office funded the effort which I'm fortunate they agreed to do.

With rare exceptions, funds should not be an issue. Not when we're talking about people who want to go on and better themselves. You're better skilled and better trained to do the job. If you've got a project office that's telling you they don't have funds, I don't buy that. You can get funds to do the right thing. Yes, there may be some rare cases but a lot of this has to do with the organization and there are examples out there. There is one organization here that won't even pony up the money for folks to go to a 2-3 week course. So a lot of it has to do with attitude. Very few people in that organization are in the Acquisition Corps because they haven't had the courses. And now that we're doing LCMC and those people are moving into the project offices, those people can't compete. They don't belong to the Corps and a lot of them aren't even Level I in their career fields. So those pockets such as this organization are the real issues. The project offices should not be an issue.

Interviewer: I recently noticed that measures are being taken to enforce the 80 CLP requirement. Will this institute change?

Well they would already have if they'd pay attention to LTG Yakovac. He's a big supporter of all this and has tried to push this down. My opinion is that the barrier is not there. It may be put there by someone in management within a given project office. If you want a master's degree and your project office puts up a barricade, elevate it. And get in line. I'm not saying you should be able to get a PhD or a master's the first 30 minutes you want to do it, but you get in line. And it should not be denied.

Interviewer: My project has always been fully supportive so I'm interested in what motivates these 'pockets of resistance'.

It's just been a mindset. They do have funding issues at these organizations, there's no doubt about that. I think these funding issues could have worked and should have been worked. Now there is some question. If the military guys don't get the training in the window, their careers are over because they are not going to the next level of responsibility. Now you can without a master's.

Interviewer: Without a master's?

Absolutely. There is some difference there. Obviously there are some courses where the military, by the nature of the way they're set up, will be the first assigned and civilians will get the remaining slots. But by and large I think that if the attitude is right in the project office/organization, the training is available. Don't be surprised if the training for the Corps as you know it now will change dramatically and it depends on the internal idea of the Army leadership. Some people think that the Acquisition Corps has been stressed so much that it has particularly damaged military careers. It's because they get so few promotions to the General Officer level and the record speaks for itself. So if you're a military officer and you are looking at the Acquisition Corps, the Acquisition Corps is not your friend.

Interviewer: Is this a migration away from military leadership to the civilian population in the Corps?

Yeah, well in the middle of this is a plan to move SESs around every 3 years. I'm all for training the workforce but the first issue is that you have to look at the mission. And my mission is not to train the workforce. Don't get me wrong it's just that it is not my number one mission. They have to be trained but my mission is to get systems into the field that are correct and timely and all the other caveats

you want to put with them. Now I'll give you industry as an example. If you take someone who's been in accounting in a large corporate entity for 25 years and you suddenly say 'I think it's time that I moved you down to logistics because it will make you a better-rounded manager', that part may be true. But what happens to that investment and expertise? You do not see industry moving people around for permanent reassignments into different areas for 3-4 years just to train the individual. It's very rare. There's usually something behind it. What you have is someone who is expert and he is continually being trained in his area of expertise. So as an example, how smart would it be to put someone in a, say PEO position, who has absolutely zero acquisition experience? You can do that at the higher levels, you can move people into those positions, you can move someone into the MILDEP 3-star position someone with no acquisition experience, if you want to. But that sends the workforce a chilling message. So you can go all the way to the top and not be in the Acquisition Corps. But there are a lot of jobs you can't do in the project office without being in the Acquisition Corps. So we're sending the wrong message here. Why do you need a GS-13 in the Acquisition Corps to advance when you could in fact have a MILDEP who has no acquisition experience? Now there are some in Army leadership who would argue with that and say 'If you can lead or manage, you can lead or manage anything'. Yeah, to a point but it's painful for some people.

Interviewer: So what do we do about it?

Well I think that part of it is broken. That's just my opinion. I think we need to be more careful about how we start moving SESs around and that's the latest thing (to move them every 3 years). To what, I don't know. If you're in the Acquisition Corps, will you be moved to another Acquisition Corps position or if this PEO retires, will the new civilian PEO be Acquisition Corps civilian or just civilian? I don't know but I think it's important that we pay attention to those things and I think it's important to train, don't get me wrong, but you have to understand what your mission is and you need well-trained people but not at the sacrifice of 3 to 4 years of poor leadership or unclear leadership by someone who is not qualified in that career field. I don't go to a lawyer to get my books balanced and file my income tax; I go see an accountant. So to me, we just need to keep focus. Rounded training is great and I support it. You need to have that early in your career. That's the time to move. It doesn't do any good to move a guy who's been a chief engineer for 25 years down to logistics. Can they do it? Yeah. And in some cases it is good to get new blood in. But you have to be careful. And I can recall a recent thrust to rotate Deputy PMs in the PEO. That ended up not being done and would have been a mistake to have that mass turnover.

Question 2:

Which are you referring to? Army Transformation or Army Acquisition Transformation? Because they are two different subjects. If you want to irritate some of the leadership today, talk about Streamline Acquisition. Because they're not buying it. The reason for it is that everyone didn't go to the classes. How many times have you been to an acquisition seminar or class and you saw the test community represented?

Interviewer: Not too many times.

That's right. So when you talk about acquisition streamlining or transformation, it was not a full buy-in. You can see system after system where we're not only testing not as much as we used to; we're testing more. So their interests weren't addressed. They don't care about 'lean', they don't care about 'streamlining' the acquisition process, they care about 'right' and in some cases it's 'right' to a fault. So that, to me, is something we need to take a look at. But I think the transformation of the Army and acquisition transformation are two different subjects. Transformation of the Army is necessary, all the time. That's a living activity. The problem is where is it going?

Interviewer: What's the end-state?

That's the unknown.

Interviewer: A number of people have very strong opinions as to what they think the end-state should be. They all agree that transformation is change of some sort, but what the result of that change ends up being is different.

What I think the issue is FCS and that's a prime example. If you ask 10 people what FCS is, you'll get at least 9 definitions. And my response to that is 'OK, if you can't define it, how can you buy it?' And I think that's part of the issue. What's affordable? What's FCS? FCS is a big communication system. And if we keep going like we're going now, some of our legacy systems are going to die on the way to FCS due to lack of funding and support. And we've walked away from some too early. So I think there is an issue with what to do with FCS. Can you afford the war, Katrina, and FCS? And the answer is 'No, we can not'. Ok, Katrina is what it is. The war is there. So the option is FCS. And to be able to get focus where you need it, and to get expenditures under control (and to me this is part of acquisition transformation), you need to get that focus.

Question 3:
Embedded in the above discussion.

Question 4:

Embedded in the above discussion.

Retired Military (Colonel), Human Resources Command

Question 1:

The answer is yes I am aware of the differences. I spent quite a bit of time studying the difference in competencies between Army civilians and the military. To be honest with you, the military acquisition community is a separate category from the military to see if they needed separate competencies and if so, what kind. It does matter and the reason I believe in that is that it's not so much that they need to be different, but those areas where they need to be the same where there's currently not a professional development program to make them similar. For example, the Army has competencies that it goes by and the Joint services has their version of competencies and DA civilians need to be fully inculcated and aware and have a basis of competencies that support the Joint warfighter. The fact that we have service component competencies is history. We are all Joint warfighters. That includes not only those that are in the military, but the military Acquisition Corps and the DA civilians. And all of those folks need to have similar competencies when it comes to interagency coordination, multicultural awareness, how to deal with change, or a host of other competencies that are out there. My emphasis would be on where they need to be similar and less so where they need to be different. Most of the differences I see are in technical aspects of civilian personnel management as opposed to the actual competency in doing your job. So the bottom line is yes, it does matter and most importantly why it matters is why they need to be more similar and the story I told earlier was why the Defense Acquisition University should be developing good leaders and should be using common Joint competencies but in fact recently in acquisition was that they just purchased the Air Force competencies off the shelf because it was cheaper. And if you compare the Joint competencies to the Air Force competencies, you'll realize that the Joint 'emerging' competencies are much better suited to developing leaders for the future than the current Air Force competencies being used by a Joint service academy.

Interviewer: Thank you for the insight.

Question 2:

Interviewer: Before you answer the next question, it seems that 'Transformation' means many different things to many different people. For some it seems to be a desired end-state, for some it's a process, and it may mean something else to someone else. So I'm particularly interested in your interpretation of Army Transformation.

I'm a big believer that Transformation has been poorly defined across (the) Department of Defense. Each person will have a separate definition of Transformation. If you talk to the Army maneuver guys, they will generally associate Transformation with Modularity. New equipment, network-centric warfare, that sort of thing. If you go to the DoD Acquisition/Logistics website, they pretty much define it as a process, i.e., Transformation is simply change and how you manage that change. Since we're going through a revolution in network-centric operations, we have to be able to manage that. So, I'm a big believer in Transformation and I think I side with the Army Acquisition Workforce in that Transformation is simply change and change management, how you visualize the future, and how you change the culture and competencies to meet that future effectively.

Interviewer: Another emerging theme from our research, and you used the term a second ago, is culture. We've done some research and found that cultural differences between civilians and military are much more pronounced/documented than we originally knew of. If you had a thought or two on cultural differences and ways to bring them closer together, I'd like to capture those.

I think the biggest cultural difference that I see is when the Army came up with something called the 'Warrior Spirit'. And their definition of the Warrior Spirit, this was probably about 4 years ago, included DA civilians. And the bottom line is that the definition says 'getting things accomplished in spite of limited resources, constraints, you name it'. Bottom line is getting things done and figuring out how to get things done. That takes ingenuity, creative thought, it talks about being goal-oriented, all those things they teach you from the very beginning of the Army culture but aren't necessarily taught (to civilians) for two reasons. One is that the civilians don't have the corresponding schooling. They don't have Airborne school, they don't have Ranger school, the Basic courses that you have to graduate from. And two, they don't have the job experiences that help them to figure out how to get things done in leadership roles with limited experiences. And probably a third, which is part of the schooling, is that they don't have the historical education, the history background, which also lends itself to understanding the role and what we've done in the past and how we've gotten that accomplished. So, I would say that the culture is probably pretty much based on those areas, both schooling and job experiences. If there's one specific cultural difference, I would argue that it's in the Warrior Spirit era.

Interviewer: You mentioned the differences in job experiences and that also appears to be an emerging theme. Your tool set is comprised of a certain set of experiences. So where is the corresponding tool set for civilians?

Part of the problem is that there aren't good measurements to metrics on how to measure leadership competency. For example, when you are a brand new 2nd Lieutenant in the Infantry, which probably correlates to maybe a GS-7, you are put in charge of 30 people. Now I don't think there are any GS-7s, if any at all, who have the definition of being a supervisor in charge of 5 people. So all those skill sets that you get from being in charge of 30 people, teaching them individual skills and how to operate as a unit, is simply something the DA civilian doesn't get as far as job experiences are concerned. So he doesn't have that background which leads to our great big cultural difference. And when you are in charge of greater and greater organizations, you learn different tools for managing them such as empowerment, such as mission-oriented command and control where you tell them and paint the picture of what you want to get done. But you don't tell them how to get it done. You don't have the ability to micromanage because you have so many people and tasks to get done and so there is some cultural differences there with basic management principles between the different cultures also.

Interviewer: 'The inability to micromanage'?

Now there are plenty of micromanagers in the Army. But I think you get more experience learning how not and how to empower your folks simply because you're put in a situation where you have to in order to get something done.

Interviewer: I just haven't viewed it in that perspective before.

In the military, in between the Lieutenant and Captain years, you have to go from seeing everyone who works for you to going to a field exercise where you have to visualize where they are and what they're doing. And that really is a leap as far as starting to get out mission-oriented statements to your subordinates as opposed to being able to look over their shoulder for everything they're doing. So you develop what I think are better management techniques and skill sets.

Question 3:

Limiting my comments to civilian acquisition leaders, I would say that the training and education system is superb when it comes to technical competence. It has significant shortfalls when it comes to management, leadership, and basic dealing with people. We have often done workforce surveys for the acquisition workforce here at Redstone, we've done focus groups, and even strategic off-sites, and the recurring theme we get over and over and over again is 'he's a great engineer or he understands the acquisition process, but he doesn't have the human skills'. And that makes an organization dysfunctional. Even little things such as coming out of a meeting and deciding how you're going to disseminate the

information. Having minutes or an agenda for a meeting? How are you going to bring everyone together and coordinate their efforts? Those sorts of skills are lacking in the Army civilian acquisition workforce. However, DAU goes a **great** job with the technical skills.

Question 4:

Interviewer: We talked earlier about our survey data and we appear to have excellent correlation and agreement among civilian and military on the core competency set.

There's a total gap between military and civilian training and education efforts and if you simply lay side-by-side the military rank vs. the civilian rank and what training you'll get, you will see a huge difference from even pre-commissioning through the 0-6 level as far as what training you'll get. For example, the majority of Colonels in the United States Army go to Senior Service College. I would probably guess that the minority, there's probably not much of an opportunity for your GS-14s, 15s in the civilian workforce, but anyway, if you just lay the two ranks side-by-side, you'll see by yourself the difference in schooling between the two efforts. As far as the leadership competencies, I do see a difference in change management as that understood and accepted by the civilians and that understood and accepted by the military. The military is constantly taught, from the earliest days, to have a vision and then a strategy as to how to get to that vision. And they are often taught how to deal with things that might go wrong, called breaches and sequels, and be prepared for those whereas most of the civilian leadership does not have the ability or the experience or education to consistently figure out where you're going, what is the end-state, and then what is your method for getting to that end-state and breaking it up into ways and means. For the last question, I would recommend keeping your technical competency programs exactly the way they are, but I would recommend several areas of instruction to the civilian acquisition workforce including history, including program management tools and techniques, team-building information, some other leadership development classes, detailed 'multi-rater' assessment program (not voluntary but comprehensive and that requires fellow IPT members, stakeholders, etc. provide feedback into a leader's development effort). And then I would recommend that the acquisition workforce take the metrics from those 360-degree assessments and build your leadership development program over what you see the shortfalls are. For example, you do 100 multi-rater assessments and 60 come back saying 'this guy doesn't know how to manage his time, run meetings, he's confusing, and we don't get any information. . . .'   Well then you need to go back to DAU, or somewhere else in the process, and do middle management, program information, team tools and techniques type blocks of instruction and incorporate that for the civilian workforce. If in fact the multi-rater or workforce feedback assessments

come back and say 'this guy can't get us all on the same sheet of music', then go back and design a class that teaches him how to come up with a vision, how to come up with a method for obtaining that vision and put that back into your schooling system.

Interviewer: That addresses leaders in place today. What about the long-term Army civilian leadership development 30 years from now? You made the reference to (the need) for leadership development program so the inference is there really isn't such a program for Army civilian leadership.

Well there is, it's just not as strong. There are some areas where I think it's weaker than it should be. As for the future, 20-30 years down the road, I think the Joint Staff (the J-7) is doing a pretty good job of putting together, based upon the future Joint operating environment, those competencies you'll need 20-30 years down the road including multicultural awareness, change management, and some other areas. In my mind, the civilian workforce is just as much a Joint warfighter as someone wearing the uniform. As a matter of fact, I'm a big proponent of a Joint service with a Joint civilian service as a part of that because you should have the competencies to work with Joint concepts, with the Navy, Marines or the Army, whether you're a military or civilian. So I would take emerging Joint competencies and use them and build civilian competencies and make sure the civilian workforce uses those because the Joint warfighter 20-30 years down the road includes, and should include, the military acquisition workforce civilian.

Interviewer: On that line and as an adjunct, is there a migration away from military acquisition positions and towards civilian? There seems to be a reduction to, or at least a less emphatic approach towards, populating Army acquisition leadership positions with military personnel and supplanting them with civilian leaders. Are you aware of such a migration or is that just perception?

I would not be surprised. I would probably anticipate that to be the reason, for that to be a true trend. The Army has a program called Mil2Civ (military to civilian). And that's based upon the realization that we don't have enough maneuver brigades in the Army to do all the missions we have to do. And so there is a specific program from the Army to change as many military slots over to civilians and taking those military slots that have been freed up and putting them back into deployable-unit type of slots. And that's all because of the budget. The budget constraints that the Army has forces us, since the only way we have to pay for more maneuver brigades, to take people out of some jobs they think they can civilianize. And that's how they raised the number of brigades and that's how they built their modular units.

Functional Division Chief (Chief Engineer in Project Office), Retired Military

Question 1:

I don't know of any documented differences in civilian leadership and Army leadership. When you go to a leadership class in the civilian arena, they taught the same competencies as they do in the military leadership. I do think there's a difference in the two, but in a certain light I do think it matters. I think the military leadership perception is that they get much more leadership training and the civilian leadership gets much more technical training. So you have those two aspects of leadership; one being the technical, which is important and where I think the civilians shine, vs. the leadership of the tactical, which is where the military leadership has an advantage.

Interviewer: You talk to tactical vs. functional. What do you think your military training provided you, as former active-duty and now a civilian that you would not have received if your education was only as a civilian?

For me, the military leadership training early in my career, when I was 22-23 years old, the responsibility I had was much greater than a 22-year-old going into the civilian market as an engineer in the Government. I was responsible for 30 men. Training them, all the day-to-day stuff that those guys did was my responsibility so I got thrust into much more of a leadership role than my civilian counterparts. I think in the civilian counterpart, as a 'functional', you enter at the lowest rung so you're the one being trained. Where as a young military officer or leader, you're the one responsible for training. It's almost a reversal of roles. So I do think the military leaders, early in their career, get much more 'leadership' opportunities and the ability to get into situations where they develop their leadership style and their competencies much earlier than their civilian counterparts do.

Interviewer: I'd like to take that point and go straight to question #3.

Personally, I think the level of training for the civilians is still very limited in comparison to the military counterparts. And even the training we get for the Acquisition Corps is focused on the technical parts of being an acquisition officer so we learn about budgeting process; we learn about the contracting process, we learn about the test process. We spend very little of our formal 'education' in the Acquisition Corps on leadership of people. And so again, when we come out of an acquisition class, we're technically competent but we're not focused at all, in my mind, on the leadership aspects of our job as a division chief or as a lead engineer. It's only looking at the technical acquisition phases.

Interviewer: So is it safe to say that the Army's civilian leadership programs, as you stated, leadership of people, and as compared to the military system, be considered sub par? Does the civilian system need to improve dramatically? Greatly? How close is it to being broken?

From a formal training perspective, I think that civilian leadership training is not broken but it is very far from being adequate. It's inadequate. And that's been the role of the military as PMs and leaders to provide that leadership. But as we transition to best-qualified PMs and product managers and best-qualified individuals, the civilian leaders are now being put in positions that have been traditionally military. While we, I think, are head and shoulders above the military in a technical 'how to do a contract', from the pure management of people and handling people, we're behind the power curve. I don't think it's broken because over time the leaders rise to the top. I think in the civilian world, there is no real leadership training for civilians.

Question 2:

Army Transformation has been defined in many, many ways. So I do believe we should transform the way we do business in the Acquisition Corps because it takes so long to get something through the system. There is a need to transform the way we do business. But based on that, we have a lot of comfort in the way we do business today. I understand what I have to do and in order to get a system into the field, what I have to do. But the problem I see in transformation is there are certain people who want to transform the program offices. The guys who are required to put products in the field want to transform by thinking outside the box. But other people don't want to get out of the box. They don't mind getting out of the box for everyone else but in their area, but in their area, they still want you to fill out these forms, you still have to go through this review. Transformation has to start at the top. The top has to enable transformation and has to allow transformation to happen and be willing to accept the risk of something getting dropped as a result of transformation. Nobody is going to do that in Aviation. We still qualify things today the same way we did 35 years ago. There's been no real innovation in testing or anything like that. We still have to do X, Y, and Z to qualify a component. So when you talk about Army Transformation, that's a part of the challenge. Yeah the PM is going to say 'let's go change the way we do business' but the guys in the other arenas of acquisition aren't willing to make that same decision.

Interviewer: Such as test?

Test is a BIG (interviewer's emphasis) area.

Question 3:

Embedded in the above discussion.

Question 4:

That's an interesting question. I perceive the gap, if there is a gap, at the young acquisition civilian level and maybe even the mid-acquisition level. I think the gap shrinks when you get to the senior acquisition level. And the reason I think that is over time, the civilian leaders learn leadership and leadership techniques. I think initially there is a large gap but I think that the military leaders are taught to lead and the civilian leaders are taught to be competent in their chosen field, whether that be engineering, technical, programmatics, business, whatever. So I think that over time, they balance each other out. What I don't see though is where the civilian side selects and nurtures and mentors the best civilian leaders and provides them with their leadership opportunities. I think the civilian leaders get good leadership but it's based on their individual management of themselves. But I do believe that there is a gap that is narrowed down somewhat. Personally I believe that at the senior acquisition level, the leadership competencies have to be the same. I'm not saying that they are the same today, but I do believe they need to be the same. I think that civilian leaders have to be leaders and understand leadership as much as they understand the technical part of the job. And so that's where I think we need to focus the training of the civilian core is in pure leadership. There's enough technical areas where they get good training but not where it helps them in a leadership area. They learn leadership through experience versus getting leadership opportunities in a planned way.

Interviewer: You talk about a 'planned way'. These interviews have brought out the fact that the military has a 'draw' function and there is no forcing function for the civilians. There is no concerted effort to 'import' civilians into a leadership development program. Is that a shortcoming of the Army? What thoughts do you have?

I do think that it is a shortcoming. And again it's a challenge because I think that the Army Acquisition Corps needs to do a better job of identifying good civilian leaders and nurturing that out. We're so concerned with a competition that nobody gets left out that sometimes we put somebody in that is not a good leader but they have all the technical skills that a given job requires. And so therefore you put someone in there and then they are in that position. The other thing that I have an issue with is there is no 'up-or-out' mentality. A civilian leader can get into a position and basically stay there for 15 years. That does two things. It stifles his growth and it stifles the growth of the people under that person. So again, from the beginning, the civilian philosophy has been a little bit different

from that of the military. But as the military side goes down, we've got to put more emphasis on the civilian workforce to take over that leadership role. The one issue I have, there is no leadership model for civilians. There are technical models to get me to a Level III certification in engineering or systems acquisition, but nothing in leadership. Now having said that, I don't think it should be open to the masses either. I think that it should be nominations through the senior leadership to identify those leaders and have some quality programs that can reach out and get more people and more leadership out of the civilians.

Interviewer: That helps gets you the 'draw' function mentioned earlier.

Yes. Too many times I see people that use, supervisors and employees alike, use education and training to get somebody out of the office or for me, to get myself out of the office. We're training the wrong people. I would also say that I think that certain levels, at the highest level civilian acquisition positions like a Division Chief let's say, shouldn't be open competition to everyone at that grade level. I think it should be more selective and that's one change we should make.

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